Aversion to LyingAlmost all culture

Aversion to Lying
Almost all cultures view honesty as an ethically desirable trait
Murphy 1993. A considerable
cognitive psychology literature has found that lies generally are considered reprehensible
Lindskold
and Walters 1983. Perhaps as a result, people often choose to be truthful, as long as it is not
too costly. Luft
1997 theorizes that individuals trade off the pecuniary benefits of lying with the
psychic benefits of honesty, so that budgets may not be completely honest, but may also not be as
dishonest as pure selfishness would dictate. Evans et al.
2001, Hannan et al.
2006, and Rankin
et al.
2008 all observe partially honest budgeting behavior. More importantly, Rankin et al.

2008 demonstrate that honesty is relevant in budgeting, beyond what would be implied by
simple inequity aversion.
There is considerable evidence that individuals’ willingness to be honest is mediated by
fairness concerns. For example, when lying would result in a perceived unfair distribution of
wealth to others, participants show a greater tendency toward honesty
Evans et al. 2001. In
contrast, when honesty would result in a perceived unfair distribution of wealth to themselves,
participants are generally more willing to lie
Evans et al. 2001; Rankin et al. 2003. The concern
for fairness is a component of the more general concept of the consequences of lying
Gneezy
2005. When deciding whether to lie, people are sensitive to how much the other party loses

Gneezy 2005. In our setting, self-interested budgeting would provide a very uneven distribution
of wealth in favor of the superior. Therefore, we expect fairness concerns to contribute to honesty.
When budgets are aggregated, subordinates have to lie only once in order to create the desired
amount of slack. In contrast, when budgets are disaggregated subordinates may have to lie several
times to create that same amount of slack. If subordinates consider lying to be undesirable, more
slack may be created with aggregation than with disaggregation.4 With respect to delayed disaggregation
relative to sequential disaggregation, the simultaneous cost observation occurring in a
delayed setting may cause the subordinates to act as if they are essentially making a single
decision, albeit a decision that encompasses several requests. This may alleviate some of the
disutility associated with lying relative to a sequential setting.

Results (Indonesian) 1:

Aversion to LyingAlmost all cultures view honesty as an ethically desirable trait
Murphy 1993. A considerablecognitive psychology literature has found that lies generally are considered reprehensible
Lindskoldand Walters 1983. Perhaps as a result, people often choose to be truthful, as long as it is nottoo costly. Luft
1997 theorizes that individuals trade off the pecuniary benefits of lying with thepsychic benefits of honesty, so that budgets may not be completely honest, but may also not be asdishonest as pure selfishness would dictate. Evans et al.
2001, Hannan et al.
2006, and Rankinet al.
2008 all observe partially honest budgeting behavior. More importantly, Rankin et al.
2008 demonstrate that honesty is relevant in budgeting, beyond what would be implied bysimple inequity aversion.There is considerable evidence that individuals’ willingness to be honest is mediated byfairness concerns. For example, when lying would result in a perceived unfair distribution ofwealth to others, participants show a greater tendency toward honesty
Evans et al. 2001. Incontrast, when honesty would result in a perceived unfair distribution of wealth to themselves,participants are generally more willing to lie
Evans et al. 2001; Rankin et al. 2003. The concernfor fairness is a component of the more general concept of the consequences of lying
Gneezy2005. When deciding whether to lie, people are sensitive to how much the other party losesGneezy 2005. Dalam pengaturan kami, tertarik diri anggaran akan memberikan distribusi yang sangat tidak meratakekayaan dalam mendukung superior. Oleh karena itu, kami berharap masalah keadilan untuk berkontribusi kejujuran.Ketika anggaran dikumpulkan, bawahan harus berbohong hanya sekali untuk menciptakan yang diinginkanjumlah kendur. Sebaliknya, ketika anggaran dipisahkan bawahan mungkin memiliki berbohong beberapakali untuk membuat jumlah yang sama kendur. Jika bawahan menganggap berbaring menjadi tidak lebihkendur dapat dibuat dengan agregasi daripada dengan disaggregation.4 terhadap Disagregasi tertundarelatif terhadap Disagregasi berurutan, pengamatan simultan biaya yang terjadi ditertunda pengaturan dapat menyebabkan Para bawahan untuk bertindak seolah-olah mereka pada dasarnya membuat satukeputusan, walaupun keputusan yang meliputi beberapa permintaan. Ini mungkin mengurangi beberapadisutility terkait dengan berbaring relatif terhadap suasana yang berurutan.