The primary mechanism for inducing compliance with CEDAW is the
periodic reporting process. Every signatory country is required to prepare
a report on its compliance with the treaty every four years. These reports
are read and discussed by a committee of experts in the field representing
all the regions of the world. Government officials meet with the committee,
called a treaty body, at UN headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and
in the past, New York, to answer questions and discuss the report and the
country’s success in complying with the standards set by the convention.
Committee members see the process as a “constructive dialogue” in which
they pose questions to governments and discuss the accomplishments and
areas that need further effort with each country team. These discussions are
sometimes critical, sometimes supportive, and sometimes instructional as
committee members make suggestions to government officials. While the
interaction can be confrontational, it can also serve to provide support for
leaders of women’s ministries or other government officials seeking to
improve women’s status in a country.
52 S. E. Merry / HAWWA 9 (2011) 49–75
Beyond this persuasive and supportive role, however, the committee can
do little to force countries to improve their performance. States may prepare
thin reports or reports that cover up discriminatory practices and
reply with evasive or scanty answers. The committee prepares “concluding
comments” on each report that are sent to governments and posted on the
Internet, and these are sometimes critical. Overall, compliance depends on
the will and commitment of national political actors and pressures from
other countries and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A recent
major study of all six treaty bodies concludes “. . . the gap between universal
right and remedy has become inescapable and inexcusable, threatening
the integrity of the international human rights legal regime. There are
overwhelming numbers of overdue reports, untenable backlogs, minimal
individual complaints from vast numbers of potential victims, and widespread
refusal of states to provide remedies when violations of individual
rights are found (Bayefsky 2001: xiii).”
CEDAW is a law without sanctions. But although it does not have the
power to punish, the convention and its monitoring committee do important
cultural work by articulating principles in a formal and public setting
and demonstrating how they apply to the countries under scrutiny. The
process of ratification, preparing reports, and presenting and discussing
reports fosters new cultural understandings of gender and gender discrimination.
The central regulatory feature of CEDAW is the definition and
naming of problems and the articulation of solutions within a prestigious
global forum. National and international NGOs as well as other international
actors endeavor to shame noncompliant governments. Governments
that resist critiques at home are sometimes more responsive on the global
stage: This is a cultural system whose coin is admission into the international
community of human-rights-compliant states. At the heart of the
legal process is the cultural work of altering the meanings of gender and of
state responsibility for gender equality. Much socio-legal scholarship suggests
that similar processes are basic to the way state law regulates behavior.
Only a small fraction of conflicts actually become cases in court and compliance
depends largely on individual consciousness of law (see Merry
1990; Ewick and Silbey 1998).
Despite its lack of sanctions, CEDAW is part of an emerging global
system of law. During the 90s and early 2000s, the international women’s
movement increasingly used international legal forums such as human
rights conventions and world conferences to promote women’s equality.
International human rights law offers new opportunities to pressure
Gender Justice and CEDAW 53
offending governments. Human rights law works in conjunction with civil
society organizations such as local, national, and transnational advocacy
networks to expose government failures to protect women’s rights and
equality and to advocate better laws and policies (see Keck and Sikkink
1998). In this period, the idea that legitimate sovereignty rests on democratic
governance and humane treatment of citizens has grown, so that the
new international “standard of civilization” includes acceptance of human
rights (Foot 2001:11). During the nineties, sovereignty was increasingly
defined as contingent on a country’s human rights performance (Foot
2000:251–2). These ideas resonate with colonial-era conceptions of what
it means to be a “civilized” nation and a respected member of the international
community.
The monitoring and surveillance procedures of the treaty bodies are the
centerpiece of the legal implementation of human rights. In a study of the
six treaty bodies, Bayefsky concludes: “It is the legal character of these
rights which places them at the cor