In what follows we shall seek to evade these philosophical
difficulties. We shall later 1 identify under the heads of
'Importance', 'Immunity from deliberate change', 'Voluntary
character of moral offences', and 'The form of moral pressure'
four cardinal features which are constantly found together
in those principles, rules, and standards of conduct
which are most commonly accounted 'moral'. These four features
reflect different aspects of a characteristic and important
function which such standards perform in social life or in
the life of individuals. This alone would justify us in marking
off whatever has these four features for separate consideration,
and above all, for contrast and comparison with law.
Moreover, the claim that morality has these four features is
neutral between rival philosophical theories as to its status or
'fundamental' character. Certainly most, if not all, philosophers
would agree that these four features were necessary in
any moral rule or principle, though they would offer very
different interpretations or explanations of the fact that
morality possesses them. It may indeed be objected that these
features though necessary are only necessary and not sufficient
to distinguish morality from certain rules or principles
of conduct which would be excluded from morality by a more
stringent test. We shall refer to the facts on which such objections
are based but we shall adhere to the wider sense of
'morality'. Our justification for this is both that this accords
with much usage and that what the word in this wide sense
designates, performs an important, distinguishable function
in social and individual life.
We shall consider first the social phenomenon often referred
to as 'the morality' of a given society or the 'accepted'
or 'conventional' morality of an actual social group. These
phrases refer to standards of conduct which are widely shared
in a particular society, and are to be contrasted with the
moral principles or moral ideals which may govern an individual's
life, but which he does not share with any considerable
number of those with whom he lives. The basic element
in the shared or accepted morality of a social group consists
of rules of the kind which we have already described in Chapter
V when we were concerned to elucidate the general idea
of obligation, and which we there called primary rules of
obligation. These rules are distinguished from others both by
the serious social pressure by which they are supported, and
by the considerable sacrifice of individual interest or inclination
which compliance with them involves. In the same chapter
we also drew a picture of a society at a stage in which such
rules were the only means of social control. We noticed that
at that stage there might be nothing corresponding to the
clear distinction made, in more developed societies, between
legal and moral rules. Possibly some embryonic form of this
distinction might be present if there were some rules which
were primarily maintained by threats of punishment for disobedience,
and others maintained by appeals to presumed respect for the rules or to feelings of guilt or remorse. When
this early stage is passed, and the step from the pre-legal into
the legal world is taken, so that the means of social control
now includes a system of rules containing rules of recognition,
adjudication, and change, this contrast between legal
and other rules hardens into something definite. The primary
rules of obligation identified through the official system are
now set apart from other rules, which continue to exist side
by side with those officially recognized. In fact in our own,
and indeed in all communities which reach this stage, there
are many types of social rule and standard lying outside the
legal system; only some of these are usually thought and spoken
of as moral, though certain legal theorists have used the
word 'moral' to designate all non-legal rules.