Now, let us suppose that Hart responds to the foregoing criticism by incorporating rights as athird element
 – 
alongside the like cases maxim and the focus on allocation
 – 
in hisconceptualization of principles of justice. Principles of justice would them be principlesrelating to allocative rights or rights addressed to problems of allocation. Are we nowequipped with a compelling account of what makes principles of justice principles of 
 justice
?I think this modified view would still face formidable obstacles, because the concerns of justice plausibly extend beyond the realm of allocation, however that slippery notion is to be 
plausibly construed. As always in philosophy, one tempting remedial measure in response to
these obstacles is to subject the meaning of ‘allocation’ to a
tremendous amount of stretching.But then the question will arise whether the thesis secures only a Pyrrhic victory, having been
emptied of the determinate content the introduction of the notion of ‘allocation’ promised to
introduce.