Nonetheless, Hart is undoubtedly correct to argue that both ordinary and philosophical moralthought also recognize a more specific notion of justice, according to which it is a particularkind of standard of inter-personal morality. How, then, are principles of justice to bedistinguished within this wider moral landscape? And how can this be done in such a way thateven flawed principles of justice can nonetheless count as principles of
justice
? The secondquestion might be thought to pose a peculiar requirement, but it is one that can be justified. If two people are really disagreeing about justice, then they must have the same subject-matterin their sights, otherwise their dispute would be merely verbal, like two people arguing about
the merits of ‘fencing’, when one has in mind a sport involving sword
-fighting and the other the erection of structures for dividing plots of land. What we are after is the
concept
of justice,of which there can be competing specific
conceptions
, including erroneous conceptions.