A more elaborate typology of five g

A more elaborate typology of five governance structures has been identified in the GVC literature: markets, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy (see Figure 3). These structures are measured and determined by three variables: the complexity of the information between actors in the chain; how the information for production can be codified; and the level of supplier competence (Frederick & Gereffi, 2009; Gereffi et al., 2005).
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Market: Market governance involves transactions that are relatively simple. Information on product specifications is easily transmitted, and suppliers can make products with minimal input from buyers. These arms-length exchanges require little or no formal cooperation between actors and the cost of switching to new partners is low for both producers and buyers. The central governance mechanism is price rather than a powerful lead firm.
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Modular: Modular governance occurs when complex transactions are relatively easy to codify. Typically, suppliers in modular chains make products to a customer’s specifications and take full responsibility for process technology using generic machinery that spreads investments across a wide customer base. This keeps switching costs low and limits transaction-specific investments, even though buyer-supplier interactions can be very complex. Linkages (or relationships) are more substantial than in simple markets because of the high volume of information flowing across the inter-firm link. Information technology and standards for exchanging information are both key to the functioning of modular governance.
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Relational: Relational governance occurs when buyers and sellers rely on complex information that is not easily transmitted or learned. This results in frequent interactions and knowledge sharing between parties. Such linkages require trust and generate mutual reliance, which are regulated through reputation, social and spatial proximity, family and ethnic ties, and the like. Despite mutual dependence, lead firms still specify what is needed, and thus have the ability to exert some level of control over suppliers. Producers in relational chains are more likely to supply differentiated products based on quality, geographic origin or other unique characteristics. Relational linkages take time to build, so the costs and difficulties required to switch to a new partner tend to be high.•
Captive: In these chains, small suppliers are dependent on one or a few buyers that often wield a great deal of power. Such networks feature a high degree of monitoring and control by the lead firm. The power asymmetry in captive networks forces suppliers to link to their buyer under conditions set by, and often specific to, that particular buyer, leading to thick ties and high switching costs for both parties. Since the core competence of the lead firms tends to be in areas outside of production, helping their suppliers upgrade their production capabilities does not encroach on this core competency, but benefits the lead firm by increasing the efficiency of its supply chain. Ethical leadership is important to ensure suppliers receive fair treatment and an equitable share of the market price.
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Hierarchy: Hierarchical governance describes chains characterized by vertical integration and managerial control within lead firms that develop and manufacture products in-house. This usually occurs when product specifications cannot be codified, products are complex, or highly competent suppliers cannot be found. While less common than in the past, this sort of vertical integration is still an important feature of the global economy.
The form of governance can change as an industry evolves and matures, and governance patterns within an industry can vary from one stage or level of the chain to another. In addition, recent research has shown that many GVCs are characterized by multiple and interacting governance structures, and these affect opportunities and challenges for economic and social upgrading (Dolan & Humphrey, 2004; Gereffi, Lee et al., 2009).

Results (Indonesian) 1:

Tipologi lebih rumit lima struktur pemerintahan telah diidentifikasi dalam literatur GVC: pasar, modular, relasional, tawanan, dan hirarki (Lihat gambar 3). Struktur ini diukur dan ditentukan oleh tiga variabel: kompleksitas informasi di antara pelaku rantai; bagaimana informasi untuk produksi dapat dikodifikasikan; dan tingkat kompetensi pemasok (Frederick & Gereffi, 2009; Gereffi et al, 2005).•Market: Pasar pemerintahan melibatkan transaksi yang relatif sederhana. Informasi mengenai spesifikasi produk yang dapat ditularkan dengan mudah, dan pemasok dapat membuat produk dengan sedikit input dari pembeli. Pertukaran lengan panjang ini memerlukan sedikit atau tidak ada kerjasama formal antara aktor dan biaya beralih ke mitra baru rendah untuk produsen dan pembeli. Mekanisme pusat pemerintahan adalah harga daripada sebuah perusahaan kuat memimpin.•Modular: Pemerintahan Modular terjadi ketika transaksi kompleks relatif mudah untuk mengkodifikasi. Biasanya, pemasok di modular rantai membuat produk dengan spesifikasi pelanggan dan mengambil tanggung jawab penuh untuk teknologi proses yang menggunakan mesin generik yang menyebar investasi di seluruh berbagai pelanggan basis. Ini membuat beralih biaya rendah dan batas-batas khusus transaksi investasi, meskipun interaksi pembeli-supplier bisa sangat kompleks. Hubungan (atau hubungan) adalah lebih besar daripada di pasar sederhana karena banyaknya informasi mengalir di seluruh link antar perusahaan. Standar untuk bertukar informasi dan teknologi informasi adalah kunci kedua untuk fungsi pemerintahan modular.•Relasional: Pemerintahan relasional terjadi ketika pembeli dan penjual mengandalkan informasi yang kompleks yang tidak mudah ditransmisikan atau belajar. Hasil ini sering berinteraksi dan berbagi antara pihak pengetahuan. Hubungan tersebut memerlukan kepercayaan dan menghasilkan saling ketergantungan, yang diatur melalui reputasi, kedekatan spasial dan sosial, keluarga dan hubungan etnis, dan sejenisnya. Meskipun saling ketergantungan, memimpin perusahaan masih menentukan apa yang diperlukan, dan dengan demikian memiliki kemampuan untuk mengerahkan beberapa tingkat pengendalian terhadap para pemasok. Produsen di rantai relasional lebih mungkin untuk menyediakan dibedakan produk-produk yang didasarkan pada kualitas, asal geografis atau karakteristik lain yang unik. Relasional keterkaitan meluangkan waktu untuk membangun, sehingga biaya dan kesulitan yang diperlukan untuk beralih ke pasangan baru cenderung tinggi. •Captive: In these chains, small suppliers are dependent on one or a few buyers that often wield a great deal of power. Such networks feature a high degree of monitoring and control by the lead firm. The power asymmetry in captive networks forces suppliers to link to their buyer under conditions set by, and often specific to, that particular buyer, leading to thick ties and high switching costs for both parties. Since the core competence of the lead firms tends to be in areas outside of production, helping their suppliers upgrade their production capabilities does not encroach on this core competency, but benefits the lead firm by increasing the efficiency of its supply chain. Ethical leadership is important to ensure suppliers receive fair treatment and an equitable share of the market price.•Hierarchy: Hierarchical governance describes chains characterized by vertical integration and managerial control within lead firms that develop and manufacture products in-house. This usually occurs when product specifications cannot be codified, products are complex, or highly competent suppliers cannot be found. While less common than in the past, this sort of vertical integration is still an important feature of the global economy.Bentuk pemerintahan yang dapat mengubah industri berkembang dan matang, dan pola pemerintahan dalam industri dapat bervariasi dari satu tingkat rantai atau tahap yang lain. Selain itu, penelitian terbaru menunjukkan bahwa banyak GVCs ditandai dengan beberapa dan berinteraksi struktur pemerintahan, dan ini mempengaruhi peluang dan tantangan untuk ekonomi dan sosial upgrade (Dolan & Humphrey, 2004; Gereffi, Lee et al., 2009).