So, Hart needed to articulate the character of moral ideals in such a way that their importance did not necessarily implicate the idea of an obligation to pursue them. And the natural though there is that some kind of non-formal feature, for example one relating moral ideals to the interests of others, is unavoidable. If so, this would be a source of importance that characteristically lies behind all three of the moral categories I have mentioned in this chapter:perfect obligations of justice, imperfect obligations and supererogatory moral ideals. To this
extent, Hart is mistaken to say that moral obligation is the ‘bedrock’ of morality, even of
social morality. That bedrock, instead, seems to consist, to a significant extent, in considerations relating to the human good and the reasons we have to respect, protect and advance it in other persons as well as ourselves. However, any account of morality that is steadfastly committed to f
ormalism, as is Hart’s, is not well
-adapted to penetrate down to the bedrock.