Abstr act This paper seeks to demonstrate the structural difference in communication of schizophrenia and autism. For a normal adult, spontaneous
communication is nothing but the transmission of phantasía (thought) by means
of perceptual objects or language. This transmission is first observed in a makebelieve play of child. Husserl named this function “perceptual phantasía,” and
this function presupposes as its basis the “internalized affection of contact”
(which functions empirically in eye contact, body contact, or voice calling me).
Regarding autism, because of the innate lack of affection of contact,
intersubjective perceptual phantasía does not occur spontaneously. Consequently, autistics do not engage in make-believe play but in stereotyped and
solipsistic play. Without the formation of perceptual phantasía, there is no
differentiation between phantasía and perception. For this reason, people with
Asperger's syndrome consider conversation not an immediate communication of
thought but a logical transmission of concepts. Schizophrenia is characterized by
a distortion in the internalized affection of contact, resulting in a disturbance of
perceptual phantasía, and this later is covered by various symptoms—for example,
delusion as a pathological kind of communication of thought. This delusion is
based on the pathological internalized affection of contact represented by a
terrifying Other