(i) Importance. To say that an essential feature of any moral
rule or standard is that it is regarded as something of great
importance to maintain may appear both truistic and vague.
Yet this feature cannot be omitted in any faithful account of
the morality of any social group or individual, nor can it be
made more precise. It is manifested in many ways: first, in
the simple fact that moral standards are maintained against the drive of strong passions which they restrict, and at the
cost of sacrificing considerable personal interest; secondly, in
the serious forms of social pressure exerted not only to obtain
conformity in individual cases, but to secure that moral
standards are taught or communicated as a matter of course
to all in society; thirdly, in the general recognition that, if
moral standards were not generally accepted, far-reaching
and distasteful changes in the life of individuals would occur.
In contrast with morals, the rules of deportment, manners,
dress, ~nd some, though not all, rules of law, occupy a rela-·
tively low place in the scale of serious importance. They may
be tiresome to follow,but they do not demand great sacrifice:
no great pressure is exerted to obtain conformity and no great
alterations in other areas of social life would follow if they
were not observed or changed. Much of the importance thus
ascribed· to the maintenance of moral rules may be very simply
explained on agreeably rationalistic lines; for even though
they demand sacrifice of private interests on the part of the
person bound, compliance with them secures vital interests
which all share alike. It does so either by directly protecting
persons from obvious harm or by maintaining the fabric of a
tolerable, orderly society. But though the rationality of much
social morality, as a protection from obvious harms, may be
defended in this way, this simple utilitarian approach is not
always possible; nor, where it is, should it be taken to represent
the point of view of those who live by a morality. After
all, a most prominent part of the morality of any society
consists of rules concerning sexual behaviour, and it is far
from clear that the importance attached to them is connected
with the belief that the conduct they forbid is harmful to
others; nor could such rules always be shown ib fact to have
this justification. Even in a modern society which has ceased
to look on its morality as divinely ordained, calculations of
harmfulness to others do not account for the importance
attached to moral regulation of sexual behaviour such as the
common veto on homosexuality. Sexual functions and feelings
are matter of such moment and emotional concern to all, that
deviations from the accepted or normal forms of their expression
easily become invested with an intrinsic 'pudor' or importance.
They are abhorred, not out of conviction of their social harmfulness but simply as 'unnatural' or in themselves
repugnant. Yet it would be absurd to deny the title of morality
to emphatic social vetoes of this sort; indeed, sexual morality
is perhaps the most prominent aspect of what plain men
think morality to be. Of course the fact that society may view
its own morality in this 'non-utilitarian' way does not mean
that its rules are immune from criticism or condemnation,
where their maintenance is judged useless or purchased at
the cost of great suffering.