Commanders don’t directly and objectively measure cohesion. Instead, commanders measure combat effectiveness: how many qualified on their assigned weapon, how many on medical profile or non deployable, and how many people are qualified on their Mission Essential Task List (METL) tasks: individual, platoon and team level tasks that support the higher headquarters missions. These are quantifiable metrics that generally translate into combat effectiveness. Researchers, however, have a myriad of ways to measure cohesion depending on what field is doing the research. Saying that social scientists measuring cohesion is “silly” undermines the entire argument. Researchers have long been interested in cohesion. Commanders measure effectiveness.
The author makes a big deal about the difference between task cohesion and social cohesion. Research suggests that task cohesion is more important to combat effectiveness than social cohesion. Task cohesion in the military and military social solidarity are actually two separate issues. If there is a lack of social cohesion in these all-male units as Simons suggests there is, it stems from a lack of trust in members of the group. The implication then is that the lack of social cohesion in these groups should negatively affect their ability to accomplish their wartime mission.
Simons is actually raising a larger sociological question beyond task cohesion. According to Emile Durkheim, one of sociology’s founding scholars, social cohesion or solidarity comes in two forms: mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity comes from minimizing differences and maximizing devotion to the common cause. This is the way solidarity has been understood as the glue that holds traditional societies together. The non-combat arms military has arguably been integrated into what Durkheim would call organic solidarity – a cohesion which is achieved through mutual dependence and belief in a common orientation toward the world around them. Organic solidarity is the glue that holds modern societies together and is based on interlocking dependencies. It does not depend on group similarity or lack of diversity as in mechanical solidarity. It is better suited to complex groups with high levels of specialization and division of labor, such as the military. By any metric, the all-volunteer force is a more combat effective force than any force that has come before us.
For a modern military unit to be cohesive, we need teammates to trust one another, to be dependent upon one another, and to be united in a common cause. We need organic solidarity and task cohesion. These requirements are not mutually exclusive to homogenous groups such as all-male combat arms units. Historically, the common cause of fighting the nation’s wars has been a predominately male enterprise. It does not follow, however, that just because this domain has been historically male that it is necessarily contingent upon it remaining male for it to exist. There is nothing inherent in being female that negates unit cohesion – not even sexual attraction, which happens and isn’t nearly the crisis that Simons seems to think it is. Simons is right that there is more to being a functional member of a team than meeting a physical standard. But there is also nothing that says women cannot be a strong, functional, integral part of the combat team, either.
We need to stop acting like women are some kind of aliens who cause men to become hormone-driven Neanderthals and expect professionalism out of both our men and women. We need to stop presuming that women in the military are synonymous with problems. We need all soldiers to treat female soldiers based on what they are: soldiers who happen to be female and focus on building trust between teammates regardless of gender. Is it an ideal? Sure. But it’s one that’s both reachable and attainable.