and that the union of primary
and secondary rules was indeed more important than orders
backed by threats as a starting-point for the understanding of law. Their argument would, however, be that this is not
enough: that even these elements are of subordinate importance,
and that until the 'necessary' relationship with morality
is made explicit and its central importance seen, the mists
which have so long clouded the understanding of law cannot
be dissipated. From this point of view the questionable or
challengeable cases of law would not merely be the law of
primitive societies or international law, which have been considered
doubtful because of their lack of a legislature, courts
with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally organized sanctions.
Far more questionable from this point of view is the
title to be treated as law of those municipal systems which
exhibit the full complement of judge, gendarme et legislateur but
fail to conform to certain fundamental requirements of justice
or morality. In the words of St Augustine' 'What are states
without justice but robber-bands enlarged?'