There are objections about viewing

There are objections about viewing Kazakhstan’s energy resources as a tool for its multi-vector foreign policy. Firstly, if Kazakhstan is to be able to use its energy resources by diversifying partners in development and by diversifying export routes, it then demands that there are energy assets and projects not yet developed to be distributed between partners. The situation in 2012 is that Kazakhstan has sold the rights to develop most of its oil and gas resources and at the same time the state control an increasing share through KMG. This evolution has developed through the 2000s, and has led to Kazakhstan having fewer projects to attract foreign investments with in 2012. This is a clear sign that Kazakhstan is becoming a more mature petroleum producing country.
The same analysis applies to pipelines with their long term commitments. Kazakhstan has as of 2012 already developed several export routes, and consequently has less to offer in future negotiations since the need for additional export pipelines is reduced. One reason for this is that existing pipelines such as CPC and Kazakhstan-China will be expanded, and thus reduce the need for new pipelines. However, the effect of Kazakhstan’s past decisions remains since the partnerships with foreign oil companies and the partnership with transit states for its export pipelines is long term. The prospect of inviting new partners using energy resources is however reduced. Energy as a tool in multi-vector may seem to be best suited for the 1990s and first half of 2000s, from the perspective that the energy assets as a bargaining chip have been exhausted. From this perspective Kazakhstan has sold away or is consuming its strategic assets of energy, as it used the nuclear arsenal dismantlement in the 1990s to start a partnership with the United States. From the perspective of energy playing a long term role in multi-vector also after it has been developed suggest that energy’s role as a tool is relevant in the whole period to 2012, and still may be in the future. While both perspectives have some merit, a middle ground is more fruitful to follow. Resource nationalism and KMG have reduced the potential for using the energy resources as a tool in the multi-vector policy, but only to a degree. Regarding energy as a tool, at first decisions on projects and investments are done once while the effects are lasting. However, as the case of Chinese interest in buying rights to Kashagan show, when contracts and rights are sold and rewritten it opens up more separate government decisions and possibilities to use energy as a tool.
Secondly, the nature of energy as a tool in Kazakhstan’s case is indirect. When Kazakhstan uses energy resources as a tool to balance foreign influence it works indirectly and gives an indirect effect by gaining autonomy and security for Kazakhstan. Hypothetically, Kazakhstan could use its energy resources directly as an energy weapon by choosing to stop oil export to one transit country and favor another. However, in practice this is not possible. Three reasons are: Kazakhstan’s vulnerable landlocked position, the lack of export options and reliability. Kazakhstan is dependent on revenues from energy export, and does not have enough spare capacity to close operating pipelines. Since Kazakhstan needs to cooperate with its neighbors to transport its energy, it cannot be seen as an unreliable partner. Using the energy weapon only once or twice will hurt Kazakhstan’s reliability in the eyes of investors and foreign partners, which may lead to Kazakhstan losing its partners. Russia is in a much stronger position, as a key transit country for Kazakhstan, and could close its pipelines to Kazakhstan if it wanted to. However, this is unlikely since both countries have a strategic partnership and mutual interest in keeping the oil and gas flowing. Since Kazakhstan’s use of its energy is indirect in relation to multi-vector and foreign policy, options for how to use energy is limited. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s indirect use is an example of a state tool that is not aggressive, and stands in contrast to the energy weapon. This difference is important to keep in mind.
Thirdly, the relationship of energy resources as a tool for Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy has some uncertainty tied to it. Even if there is a close relationship between energy and multivector as argued by Shaffer (2009), a timely question is if the roles can be the other way around, meaning that foreign policy and multi-vector is a tool to help develop Kazakhstan’s economy and its energy resources. This perspective follows the argument by Hanks (2009, 264), that the need to develop production and export routes has driven the multi-vector policy. This perspective has some merit since Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has played an indispensible part in development its energy resources and to secure export routes. Foreign policy negotiations have been required to secure long term agreements and understanding with transit countries which is necessary to be able to develop export routes from a landlocked position. Diplomacy was therefore important to secure the development of the CPC pipeline, the trans-Caspian route and the pipelines to China. Foreign policy has also helped Kazakhstan unlock new energy resources for development, such as the agreement with Russia in 2002 on delimitation of the Caspian Sea which opened up Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil and gas potential. Foreign policy and energy can therefore possibly be a tool for the state in the pursuit of national interests and the goals of the multi-vector policy.

Results (Russian) 1:

Есть возражения о просмотре Казахстана энергетических ресурсов как средство для ее многовекторной внешней политики. Во-первых если Казахстан заключается в том, чтобы иметь возможность использовать свои энергетические ресурсы путем диверсификации партнеров в области развития и диверсификации экспортных маршрутов, он затем требует, что есть проектов, еще не разработаны, чтобы быть распределены между партнерами и энергетические активы. В 2012 году ситуация, что Казахстан продала права на разработку большую часть своих ресурсов нефти и газа, и в то же время государство контролирует все большую долю через КМГ. Эта эволюция разработал через х и привела в Казахстан, имея меньше проектов для привлечения иностранных инвестиций в 2012 году. Это явный признак, что Казахстан становится более зрелым нефтяного производства страны. The same analysis applies to pipelines with their long term commitments. Kazakhstan has as of 2012 already developed several export routes, and consequently has less to offer in future negotiations since the need for additional export pipelines is reduced. One reason for this is that existing pipelines such as CPC and Kazakhstan-China will be expanded, and thus reduce the need for new pipelines. However, the effect of Kazakhstan’s past decisions remains since the partnerships with foreign oil companies and the partnership with transit states for its export pipelines is long term. The prospect of inviting new partners using energy resources is however reduced. Energy as a tool in multi-vector may seem to be best suited for the 1990s and first half of 2000s, from the perspective that the energy assets as a bargaining chip have been exhausted. From this perspective Kazakhstan has sold away or is consuming its strategic assets of energy, as it used the nuclear arsenal dismantlement in the 1990s to start a partnership with the United States. From the perspective of energy playing a long term role in multi-vector also after it has been developed suggest that energy’s role as a tool is relevant in the whole period to 2012, and still may be in the future. While both perspectives have some merit, a middle ground is more fruitful to follow. Resource nationalism and KMG have reduced the potential for using the energy resources as a tool in the multi-vector policy, but only to a degree. Regarding energy as a tool, at first decisions on projects and investments are done once while the effects are lasting. However, as the case of Chinese interest in buying rights to Kashagan show, when contracts and rights are sold and rewritten it opens up more separate government decisions and possibilities to use energy as a tool. Во-вторых природа энергии как инструмент в случае Казахстана является косвенным. Когда Казахстан использует энергетические ресурсы в качестве инструмента баланса иностранным влиянием он косвенно работает и дает косвенное воздействие путем обретения самостоятельности и безопасности для Казахстана. Гипотетически Казахстан может использовать свои энергетические ресурсы непосредственно как энергетического оружия, выбрав остановить экспорт нефти в одной стране транзита и пользу другой. Однако на практике это не возможно. Три причины: уязвимых к морю позиция Казахстана, отсутствие параметров экспорта и надежности. Казахстан зависит от доходов от экспорта электроэнергии и не имеют достаточно запасных способность закрыть эксплуатации трубопроводов. Поскольку Казахстан должен сотрудничать со своими соседями для перевозки его энергии, его нельзя рассматривать как ненадежного партнера. Только один или два раза с помощью оружия энергии будет больно надежность Казахстана в глазах инвесторов и иностранных партнеров, которые могут привести к потери своих партнеров в Казахстане. Россия находится в гораздо более выгодном положении, как ключевой транзитной страной для Казахстана и может закрыть его трубопроводов в Казахстане, если он хочет. Однако это маловероятно, поскольку обе страны имеют стратегического партнерства и взаимного интереса в нефть и газ течет. Поскольку Казахстан своей энергии используется косвенные связи с многовекторная и внешней политики, вариантов использования энергии является ограниченным. Тем не менее косвенное использование Казахстана является примером государства инструмент, который не является агрессивным и стоит в отличие от энергетического оружия. Это различие очень важно иметь в виду. В-третьих отношения энергетических ресурсов как инструмента для Казахстана многовекторная политика имеет некоторую неопределенность, привязанной к ней. Даже если существует тесная взаимосвязь между энергетикой и Поливектор, как утверждал Шаффер (2009), своевременный вопрос заключается, если роли может быть наоборот, означает, что внешней политики и многовекторной является инструментом, чтобы помочь развивать казахстанской экономики и ее энергетических ресурсов. Этой точки зрения следует аргумент Хэнкс (2009, 264), что необходимость разработки производства и экспортных маршрутов загнал многовекторную политику. Эта перспектива имеет определенные достоинства, так как внешней политики Казахстана сыграла незаменимая роль в развитии своих энергетических ресурсов и обеспечения экспортных маршрутов. Внешняя политика переговоров потребовали обеспечить долгосрочные соглашения и понимания с транзитными странами, который необходимо иметь возможность развивать экспортных маршрутов от морю позиции. Поэтому важно обеспечить развитие трубопровода КТК, Транс Каспийского маршрута и трубопроводов в Китай дипломатии. Внешняя политика помогла также разблокировать новых энергетических ресурсов для развития, таких, как соглашение с Россией в 2002 году о делимитации Каспийского моря, который открыл Казахстанской каспийской нефти и газа потенциал Казахстана. Внешней политики и энергии может поэтому быть инструментом для государства в реализации национальных интересов и целей многовекторной политики.