Abstract
Most comparative studies on corruption are geared towards the analysis of factors
dealing with the selection and the incentives of actors taking policy decisions in a
state. With few exceptions, such as Rauch & Evans (2000), the selection and
incentives of actors within the state apparatus in charge of implementing policies have
been neglected. In turn, the studies that take bureaucratic features into account do not
control for political institutions. This paper aims at bridging the gap between these
two institutionalist approaches by analyzing an original dataset from a survey
answered by 520 experts from 52 countries. There are two main empirical findings.
First, some bureaucratic factors, and especially meritocratic recruitment, reduce
corruption, even when controlling for the impact of most standard political variables
such as years of democracy, the number of veto players or the type of electoral
system. Second, the analysis shows that other allegedly relevant features in the
bureaucratic institutionalist literature, such as public employees’ competitive salaries,
career stability or internal promotion, do not have a significant impact.