Tax Compliance without Amnesty Consider risk-neutral agents, each with translation - Tax Compliance without Amnesty Consider risk-neutral agents, each with Indonesian how to say

Tax Compliance without Amnesty Cons

Tax Compliance without Amnesty
Consider risk-neutral agents, each with an identical project t
hat has a two period life, and
yields the net income Y in each period.
10
An agent chooses either to register her business
(operate in the formal sector) or to remain unregistered and op
erate in the informal sector. She
also faces the choice of either paying the income tax at
the proportional rate t or hiding her
income. We assume, reasonably, that compliance with the requirem
ents of the Tax Authority
(TA) automatically ensures registration, but that the converse
is not necessarily true: a business
that is registered may choose to evade taxes. However, non-compliance b
y a registered project is
easier to detect due to its greater visibility; projects
in the informal sector are more difficult to
trace and monitor. Let m be the exogenous probability of detecti
on of a tax evader in the
informal sector and μ the corresponding probability in the form
al sector.
11
The sectoral
difference in the ease of detection implies that m < μ. For
ease of exposition, we assume the tax
and the fine to be proportional to Y. If caught, an agent is forced to pay
the fine fY in addition to
her outstanding taxes, tY. Furthermore, detection of non-compliance i
n period 1 forces the
agent, as part of the detection process, to be visible (or registered) in p
eriod 2.
As discussed in the previous section, our benchmark case is the situa
tion where, in the
absence of the tax amnesty, the equilibrium of the two period m
odel is one where the agent
initially (i.e. in period 1) chooses to be non-compliant. Against thi
s background, we examine the
difference that the introduction of a tax amnesty may impleme
nt.
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Tax Compliance without Amnesty Consider risk-neutral agents, each with an identical project that has a two period life, and yields the net income Y in each period.10 An agent chooses either to register her business (operate in the formal sector) or to remain unregistered and operate in the informal sector. She also faces the choice of either paying the income tax at the proportional rate t or hiding her income. We assume, reasonably, that compliance with the requirements of the Tax Authority (TA) automatically ensures registration, but that the converse is not necessarily true: a business that is registered may choose to evade taxes. However, non-compliance by a registered project is easier to detect due to its greater visibility; projects in the informal sector are more difficult to trace and monitor. Let m be the exogenous probability of detection of a tax evader in the informal sector and μ the corresponding probability in the formal sector.11 The sectoral difference in the ease of detection implies that m < μ. For ease of exposition, we assume the tax and the fine to be proportional to Y. If caught, an agent is forced to pay the fine fY in addition to her outstanding taxes, tY. Furthermore, detection of non-compliance in period 1 forces the agent, as part of the detection process, to be visible (or registered) in period 2. As discussed in the previous section, our benchmark case is the situation where, in the absence of the tax amnesty, the equilibrium of the two period model is one where the agent initially (i.e. in period 1) chooses to be non-compliant. Against this background, we examine the difference that the introduction of a tax amnesty may implement.
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Results (Indonesian) 2:[Copy]
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Kepatuhan Pajak tanpa Amnesty
Pertimbangkan agen risiko-netral, masing-masing dengan sebuah proyek t identik
hat memiliki kehidupan masa dua, dan
menghasilkan Y laba bersih pada setiap periode.
10
Agen memilih baik untuk mendaftarkan usahanya
(beroperasi di sektor formal) atau untuk tetap terdaftar dan op
erate di sektor informal. Dia
juga menghadapi pilihan baik membayar pajak penghasilan pada
proporsional tingkat t atau menyembunyikan nya
pendapatan. Kami berasumsi, cukup, bahwa sesuai dengan requirem
Ent dari Otoritas Pajak
(TA) secara otomatis memastikan pendaftaran, tapi itu sebaliknya
tidak selalu benar: bisnis
yang terdaftar dapat memilih untuk menghindari pajak. Namun, non-kepatuhan b
y proyek terdaftar adalah
lebih mudah untuk mendeteksi karena visibilitas yang lebih besar; proyek
di sektor informal lebih sulit untuk
melacak dan memantau. Biarkan m adalah probabilitas eksogen detecti
pada dari pengelak pajak di
sektor informal dan arah datang gelombang probabilitas yang sesuai dalam bentuk
sektor al.
11
The sektoral
perbedaan dalam kemudahan deteksi menyiratkan bahwa m <μ. Untuk
kemudahan eksposisi, kita asumsikan pajak
dan denda yang akan sebanding dengan Y. Jika tertangkap, agen dipaksa untuk membayar
denda TA selain
pajak luar biasa nya, tY. Selanjutnya, deteksi non-kepatuhan i
n periode 1 memaksa
agen, sebagai bagian dari proses deteksi, akan terlihat (atau terdaftar) di p
eriode 2.
Sebagaimana dibahas dalam bagian sebelumnya, kasus patokan kami adalah situa
tion mana, dalam
tidak adanya tax amnesty, keseimbangan periode dua m
odel adalah salah satu di mana agen
awalnya (yaitu pada periode 1) memilih untuk menjadi non-compliant. Terhadap thi
latar belakang, kami memeriksa
perbedaan bahwa pengenalan amnesti pajak dapat impleme
nt.
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