Another way of attacking the proble

Another way of attacking the problem of possibly false answers is to try to dispense with them altogether. In other word, one can try- and philosophers have tried –to some truths, some answers, that are beyond any doubt and on which the rest of the structure of our knowledge can be based. This has been the most common type of approach to epistemology among philosophers. It is sometimes called epistemological foundationalism. It is wrought with formidable problems, however.
One problem is where to find the indubitable bases for our knowledge. A perennial candidate has been sense perception. But seeing should not always be believing, because it does not put us in direct touch with its objects. Perceptual illusions and hallucinations have been used as evidence to the contrary. With a modicum of ingenuity, a psychological experiment can even make us “see” impossible object. And even when no mistakes are involved, sense perception does not give us directly the information we spontaneously think that we receive from it. For instance, George Berkeley urged especially forcefully, our depth (three-dimensional) seeing cannot, geometrically speaking, be automatic but is inevitably constructed from different clues, such as an unconscious comparison between the images on the retinas of one’s two eyes. If anything, contemporary scientific study of perception has reinforced this indirectness and complexity of the process of sense perception, which makes its massages dependent on all sorts of different preconditions. For instance, according to one contemporary psychologist of perception, David Marr, the processing of visual information in the human central nervous system proceeds by stages. First, out of the visual input a primal sketch (as Marr calls it) is conctructed, in which edges, boundaries, and regions of the visual field are distinguished. From this a two-and-a-half dimensional representation is constructed in which surfaces and shapes relative to the viewer are included. Finally, from those perspectival representations a truly three-dimensioanal object-centered model (representation) is created, according to Marr. Even if his theory is not accepted by all scientists, competing accounts are likely to be even more complex. Needles to say, all the processes described by Marr are unconscious. All of them involve neural processing and hence can in principle go wrong. Thus visual perception does not put us in direct contact with reality and is not infallible. Even one of philosophers’ favorite example of sense qualities, color, is not a simple matterof registrations of the kind of light that hits one’s retina, but the end product of a complicated construction process in the brain.

Results (Indonesian) 1:

Cara lain untuk menyerang masalah jawaban mungkin palsu adalah untuk mencoba untuk membuang mereka sama sekali. Dengan kata lain, seseorang dapat mencoba - dan filsuf telah mencoba – beberapa kebenaran, beberapa jawaban, yang tanpa keraguan dan di mana seluruh struktur pengetahuan dapat didasarkan. Ini telah menjadi jenis yang paling umum pendekatan Epistemologi antara filsuf. Kadang-kadang disebut epistemologis fondamentalisme. Itu didapat dengan masalah berat, namun.One problem is where to find the indubitable bases for our knowledge. A perennial candidate has been sense perception. But seeing should not always be believing, because it does not put us in direct touch with its objects. Perceptual illusions and hallucinations have been used as evidence to the contrary. With a modicum of ingenuity, a psychological experiment can even make us “see” impossible object. And even when no mistakes are involved, sense perception does not give us directly the information we spontaneously think that we receive from it. For instance, George Berkeley urged especially forcefully, our depth (three-dimensional) seeing cannot, geometrically speaking, be automatic but is inevitably constructed from different clues, such as an unconscious comparison between the images on the retinas of one’s two eyes. If anything, contemporary scientific study of perception has reinforced this indirectness and complexity of the process of sense perception, which makes its massages dependent on all sorts of different preconditions. For instance, according to one contemporary psychologist of perception, David Marr, the processing of visual information in the human central nervous system proceeds by stages. First, out of the visual input a primal sketch (as Marr calls it) is conctructed, in which edges, boundaries, and regions of the visual field are distinguished. From this a two-and-a-half dimensional representation is constructed in which surfaces and shapes relative to the viewer are included. Finally, from those perspectival representations a truly three-dimensioanal object-centered model (representation) is created, according to Marr. Even if his theory is not accepted by all scientists, competing accounts are likely to be even more complex. Needles to say, all the processes described by Marr are unconscious. All of them involve neural processing and hence can in principle go wrong. Thus visual perception does not put us in direct contact with reality and is not infallible. Even one of philosophers’ favorite example of sense qualities, color, is not a simple matterof registrations of the kind of light that hits one’s retina, but the end product of a complicated construction process in the brain.

Results (Indonesian) 2:

Cara lain untuk menyerang masalah jawaban mungkin palsu adalah mencoba untuk membuang mereka sama sekali. Dengan kata lain, seseorang dapat mencoba-dan filsuf telah mencoba -untuk beberapa kebenaran, jawaban, yang berada di luar keraguan dan yang sisa struktur pengetahuan kita dapat didasarkan. Ini telah menjadi jenis yang paling umum dari pendekatan epistemologi kalangan filsuf. Hal ini kadang-kadang disebut fondasionalisme epistemologis. Hal ini tempa dengan masalah tangguh, namun.
Satu masalah adalah di mana untuk menemukan dasar bisa diragukan untuk pengetahuan kita. Calon abadi telah persepsi akal. Tapi lihat tidak harus selalu percaya, karena tidak menempatkan kami berhubungan langsung dengan objek-objeknya. Ilusi persepsi dan halusinasi telah digunakan sebagai bukti sebaliknya. Dengan jumlah sedikit kecerdikan, percobaan psikologis bahkan bisa membuat kita "melihat" objek yang tidak mungkin. Dan bahkan ketika tidak ada kesalahan yang terlibat, persepsi rasa tidak memberi kita langsung informasi yang kami spontan berpikir bahwa kita terima dari itu. Misalnya, George Berkeley mendesak terutama paksa, kedalaman kami (tiga dimensi) lihat bisa tidak, geometris berbicara, menjadi otomatis tetapi pasti dibangun dari petunjuk yang berbeda, seperti perbandingan sadar antara gambar pada retina dua mata seseorang. Jika ada, studi ilmiah kontemporer persepsi telah diperkuat indirectness ini dan kompleksitas proses persepsi rasa, yang membuat pijat sangat tergantung pada segala macam prasyarat yang berbeda. Misalnya, menurut salah satu psikolog kontemporer persepsi, David Marr, pengolahan informasi visual dalam hasil sistem manusia saraf pusat secara bertahap. Pertama, dari input visual sketsa primal (seperti Marr menyebutnya) adalah conctructed, di mana tepi, batas-batas, dan wilayah dari bidang visual dibedakan. Dari ini representasi dua-dan-a-setengah dimensi dibangun di mana permukaan dan bentuk relatif penampil disertakan. Akhirnya, dari orang-orang representasi perspektival benar-benar tiga dimensioanal model objek yang berpusat (representasi) dibuat, menurut Marr. Bahkan jika teorinya tidak diterima oleh semua ilmuwan, rekening bersaing cenderung lebih kompleks. Jarum untuk mengatakan, semua proses yang dijelaskan oleh Marr tidak sadar. Semua dari mereka melibatkan pengolahan saraf dan karenanya dapat pada prinsipnya salah. Jadi persepsi visual tidak menempatkan kami dalam kontak langsung dengan realitas dan tidak sempurna. Bahkan salah satu contoh favorit filsuf 'kualitas rasa, warna, bukan pendaftaran matterof sederhana dari jenis cahaya yang hits retina seseorang, tetapi produk akhir dari proses konstruksi yang rumit di otak.