It is in some ways remarkable that, during a period in the history of philosophy when moralphilosophy was in a parlous condition, Hart should have devoted an entire chapter of
TheConcept of Law
to the discussion of the nature of justice and morality. Perhaps we should begrateful that the book grew out of a lecture course on jurisprudence that Hart delivered to
undergraduates at the University of Oxford, the chapter’s prese
nce reflecting exigencies quiteother than those dictated by any prevailing philosophical fashion. In any case, there is much inthis chapter to admire and from which we still need to learn. The guiding ideas that moralstandards are one species of practical standards among others, and that principles of justice in
turn are only one kind of moral principle among others, seem to me important andfundamentally sound. Contemporary legal and political philosophy, in particular, stands togain a lot even now by engaging more fully with that second idea.
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Unfortunately, Hart’s
pursuit of this doubly pluralistic agenda eventually runs aground. His meditation of justicefails in virtue of ignoring the historically resonant hypothesis that the scope of that value isimportantly delineated by the concept of a right. Meanwhile, his attempt to articulate thenature of the moral domain as a whole suffers from an excessive formalism, something thatwas probably inevitable in light of his failure to give the notion of critical morality its centralplace when elucidating the nature of the moral.