If Condition (7) holds, the employee stays in the firm; otherwise, she forms a start-up.
Appendix A shows that for appropriate values of σ and δ we have that XFs + XE s − XFm N 0. Furthermore, we assume that the costs of start-up formation are sufficiently small that a start-up always forms if the founder can appropriate the entire profits (i.e. for α = 1). Additionally, we assume that in case the founder can appropriate the entire profits, her profits are increasing in K. Finally, in order to guarantee the existence of a finite efficient investment level (i.e. the optimal investment considering the sum of profits of the incumbent, the employee, and the provider of complementary assets), we consider only scenarios in which πFs(K) + πEs(K) − C(K) is strictly concave. Formally, recalling that K ∈ [Kl, Ku], 0