– : Decisions on position in base s

– : Decisions on position in base salary scale

: Decisions on supplemental payments which are paid every year : Decisions on supplemental incidental payments

Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010. See Annex 3 for notes (www.oecd.org/edu/eag2010).

Please refer to the Reader’s Guide in Education at a Glance 2010 for information concerning the symbols replacing missing data.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932310510

45©OECD2011

Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from Around the World


Chapter 3

Te a ch e r E va l u a t i o n a n d C o m p e n s a t i o n


Less than half of OECD countries offer additional payments based on teachers’ family status or demographic characteristics, and in most cases these are yearly payments.

Many countries provide additional payments based on teachers’ qualifications, professional development and performance. The most common types of payments based on teachers’ initial education and qualifications are for an initial education qualification higher than the minimum requirement and/or a level of teacher certification and teacher education higher than the minimum requirements. These are available in around two-thirds of OECD countries, with half of countries offering both types. They are used in nearly all countries as a criterion for base salary. Eighteen countries offer additional payments for the successful completion of professional-development activities. In some countries, adjustments to the base salary are awarded to teachers annually or on an incidental basis, either by the head teacher or school principal, or by the local, regional or national government. Countries vary in whether they provide such payments as an addition to teachers’ base salary, in the form of a yearly payment or on an incidental, or “one-off”, basis.

Developing a closer relationship between teacher performance and compensation has proved difficult.

Thirteen OECD countries and two non-OECD countries with available data offer an additional payment for outstanding performance in teaching. In two-third of these countries, these are discretionary payments, and in ten, they are mostly annual additions to teachers’ salaries. It is notable that in 13 of the 15 countries with available data that offer this incentive – Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden – the decision to award the additional payments can be made at the school level. Formal metrics, including student-achievement data, come into play in some countries, but most decisions are based on the nuanced judgments of professional colleagues who, in turn, base their opinions on multiple sources of data, only some of which are measured in any formal way.

Performance-based reward systems in OECD countries can be classified into three types: “Performance pay”, which generally involves measuring teacher performance based on student outcomes and other measures and providing strong performers with higher pay and, in some cases, advancement opportunities; “Knowledge-and skill-based” compensation, which generally involves higher pay for demonstrated knowledge and skills which are believed to enhance student performance; and “School-based compensation”, which generally involves group-based financial rewardThose who argue in support of performance-based rewards say that it is fairer to reward teachers who perform well rather than paying all equally; performance-based pay motivates teachers and improves student performance; and a clearer connection between spending on schools and student performance builds public support. Those who oppose performance-based pay usually argue that fair and accurate evaluation is difficult, because performance cannot be determined objectively; co-operation among teachers is reduced; teachers are not motivated by financial rewards; teaching becomes narrowly focused on the criteria being used; and the costs of implementation are too high. Research in this field is difficult and there are few reliable studies.

The experience so far with performance-based rewards raises issues about how to design such awards, including issues relating to…

Though experience with performance-based rewards systems in OECD countries is still limited, OECD research highlights a number of common design around what to reward, whom to reward and how to
structure rewards33. 46©OECD2011

Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from Around the World


Chapter 3

Te a ch e r E va l u a t i o n a n d C o m p e n s a t i o n


…what to reward…

Performance-based rewards imply rewarding something more than credentials and years of experience, which have been shown to be weak indicators of teacher effectiveness. Research has shown that it is possible to evaluate effective teaching, linked with improved student results, thus making it possible, in principle, to include evaluations both of teacher performance and student performance as part of a teacher-compensation system. Whatever criteria are chosen, they need to be clear to teachers and consistently applied.

Measures of teacher performance need to be valid, reliable and agreed by teachers themselves to be fair and accurate. In some countries, these include assessments of teacher performance that are based on multiple observations by trained evaluators using a standards-based rubric that teachers believe reflects good instructional practices. Other measures of teacher performance may include contributions to school-improvement efforts or performance in specific areas based on external certifications.

Some approaches include student performance in the reward systems for teachers, which require robust data management systems that are able to connect student and teacher data. In particular, if “value-added” measures are used, databases need to be able to track student progress from year to year, to give an indication of what any individual teacher has added to a student’s attainment. The Data Quality Campaign identifies a number of data requirements for such approaches.34 Measures of student performance include test scores, enrolment in advanced courses, student attendance, student graduation rates, and student dropout rates. Analysis of student work can provide a further measure of student performance, but it requires time and funding for a group of trained assessors to evaluate portfolios of student work and determine evidence of growth. If the tests are to be used to determine value-added progress that students have made (i.e. using statistical methods to analyze a student’s current scores in light of past performance to get an accurate reading of the effect of the school/teacher on the student’s performance), then tests needs to be designed to enable analyses of year-to-year gains in performance at the individual student level.

…whom to reward, and…

A major issue is whether the rewards are targeted to individual teachers, groups of teachers or the whole school. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages.

Individual rewards can both select the most effective staff and motivate individuals to work harder, giving them a sense of direct control over their chances of reward. However, it can be difficult to distinguish the impact made by an individual teacher, compared to previous teachers or other factors such as the school environment.

An alternative is to consider the performance of a group of teachers as a unit – such as a grade-level teams, a disciplinary departments, or another grouping that fits a school’s structure and mission. Group rewards have been found to promote staff cohesion, feelings of fairness and productivity norms, and they may foster the transfer of knowledge and mutual learning among teachers which can lead to improved results. School-wide rewards can encourage collaboration among teachers to ensure the school meets the criteria for rewards, but they may have disadvantages, such as diluting the link between individual effort and reward. Any group approach runs the risk of “free riders”, but some systems seek to limit these by keeping groups small or by establishing programs to exert social pressure as well as to monitor peer contributions to the group’s performance. Another consideration is whether to reward other staff than classroom teachers. Principals and assistant principals may not teach, but their work is critical to establishing an environment
that is conducive to improving student achievement.

Results (Vietnamese) 1:

– : Decisions on position in base salary scale: Decisions on supplemental payments which are paid every year : Decisions on supplemental incidental paymentsSource: OECD, Education at a Glance 2010. See Annex 3 for notes (www.oecd.org/edu/eag2010).Please refer to the Reader’s Guide in Education at a Glance 2010 for information concerning the symbols replacing missing data.1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932310510 45©OECD2011 Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from Around the World Chapter 3Te a ch e r E va l u a t i o n a n d C o m p e n s a t i o nLess than half of OECD countries offer additional payments based on teachers’ family status or demographic characteristics, and in most cases these are yearly payments.Many countries provide additional payments based on teachers’ qualifications, professional development and performance. The most common types of payments based on teachers’ initial education and qualifications are for an initial education qualification higher than the minimum requirement and/or a level of teacher certification and teacher education higher than the minimum requirements. These are available in around two-thirds of OECD countries, with half of countries offering both types. They are used in nearly all countries as a criterion for base salary. Eighteen countries offer additional payments for the successful completion of professional-development activities. In some countries, adjustments to the base salary are awarded to teachers annually or on an incidental basis, either by the head teacher or school principal, or by the local, regional or national government. Countries vary in whether they provide such payments as an addition to teachers’ base salary, in the form of a yearly payment or on an incidental, or “one-off”, basis.Developing a closer relationship between teacher performance and compensation has proved difficult.Thirteen OECD countries and two non-OECD countries with available data offer an additional payment for outstanding performance in teaching. In two-third of these countries, these are discretionary payments, and in ten, they are mostly annual additions to teachers’ salaries. It is notable that in 13 of the 15 countries with available data that offer this incentive – Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden – the decision to award the additional payments can be made at the school level. Formal metrics, including student-achievement data, come into play in some countries, but most decisions are based on the nuanced judgments of professional colleagues who, in turn, base their opinions on multiple sources of data, only some of which are measured in any formal way.Performance-based reward systems in OECD countries can be classified into three types: “Performance pay”, which generally involves measuring teacher performance based on student outcomes and other measures and providing strong performers with higher pay and, in some cases, advancement opportunities; “Knowledge-and skill-based” compensation, which generally involves higher pay for demonstrated knowledge and skills which are believed to enhance student performance; and “School-based compensation”, which generally involves group-based financial rewardThose who argue in support of performance-based rewards say that it is fairer to reward teachers who perform well rather than paying all equally; performance-based pay motivates teachers and improves student performance; and a clearer connection between spending on schools and student performance builds public support. Those who oppose performance-based pay usually argue that fair and accurate evaluation is difficult, because performance cannot be determined objectively; co-operation among teachers is reduced; teachers are not motivated by financial rewards; teaching becomes narrowly focused on the criteria being used; and the costs of implementation are too high. Research in this field is difficult and there are few reliable studies.The experience so far with performance-based rewards raises issues about how to design such awards, including issues relating to…Though experience with performance-based rewards systems in OECD countries is still limited, OECD research highlights a number of common design around what to reward, whom to reward and how tostructure rewards33. 46©OECD2011 Building a High-Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from Around the World Chapter 3Te a ch e r E va l u a t i o n a n d C o m p e n s a t i o n…what to reward…Performance-based rewards imply rewarding something more than credentials and years of experience, which have been shown to be weak indicators of teacher effectiveness. Research has shown that it is possible to evaluate effective teaching, linked with improved student results, thus making it possible, in principle, to include evaluations both of teacher performance and student performance as part of a teacher-compensation system. Whatever criteria are chosen, they need to be clear to teachers and consistently applied.Measures of teacher performance need to be valid, reliable and agreed by teachers themselves to be fair and accurate. In some countries, these include assessments of teacher performance that are based on multiple observations by trained evaluators using a standards-based rubric that teachers believe reflects good instructional practices. Other measures of teacher performance may include contributions to school-improvement efforts or performance in specific areas based on external certifications.Some approaches include student performance in the reward systems for teachers, which require robust data management systems that are able to connect student and teacher data. In particular, if “value-added” measures are used, databases need to be able to track student progress from year to year, to give an indication of what any individual teacher has added to a student’s attainment. The Data Quality Campaign identifies a number of data requirements for such approaches.34 Measures of student performance include test scores, enrolment in advanced courses, student attendance, student graduation rates, and student dropout rates. Analysis of student work can provide a further measure of student performance, but it requires time and funding for a group of trained assessors to evaluate portfolios of student work and determine evidence of growth. If the tests are to be used to determine value-added progress that students have made (i.e. using statistical methods to analyze a student’s current scores in light of past performance to get an accurate reading of the effect of the school/teacher on the student’s performance), then tests needs to be designed to enable analyses of year-to-year gains in performance at the individual student level.…whom to reward, and…A major issue is whether the rewards are targeted to individual teachers, groups of teachers or the whole school. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages.Phần thưởng cá nhân cả hai có thể chọn các nhân viên có hiệu quả nhất và thúc đẩy các cá nhân để làm việc khó hơn, giúp cho họ một cảm giác trực tiếp quyền kiểm soát của cơ hội của phần thưởng. Tuy nhiên, nó có thể được khó khăn để phân biệt tác động được thực hiện bởi một giáo viên cá nhân, so với giáo viên trước đây hoặc các yếu tố khác như môi trường học tập.Một cách khác là để xem xét hiệu suất của một nhóm các giáo viên như một đơn vị-chẳng hạn như lớp cấp đội, Phòng ban kỷ luật, hoặc một nhóm mà phù hợp với một trường học cấu trúc và nhiệm vụ. Phần thưởng nhóm đã được tìm thấy để thúc đẩy nhân viên gắn kết, cảm giác của sự công bằng và chỉ tiêu năng suất, và họ có thể thúc đẩy chuyển giao kiến thức và học hỏi lẫn nhau giữa các giáo viên có thể dẫn đến cải thiện kết quả. Trường học toàn phần thưởng có thể khuyến khích hợp tác giữa các giáo viên để đảm bảo trường đáp ứng tiêu chí cho phần thưởng, nhưng họ có thể có nhược điểm, chẳng hạn như pha loãng liên kết giữa các nỗ lực cá nhân và phần thưởng. Bất kỳ phương pháp tiếp cận nhóm chạy các nguy cơ của "tự do người đi", nhưng một số hệ thống tìm kiếm để hạn chế những bằng cách giữ nhóm nhỏ hoặc bằng cách thiết lập chương trình để gây áp lực xã hội cũng như giám sát đồng đẳng đóng góp cho hiệu suất của nhóm. Xem xét khác là liệu để thưởng cho nhân viên khác hơn so với giáo viên lớp học. Hiệu trưởng và các trợ lý hiệu trưởng có thể không dạy, nhưng công việc của họ là rất quan trọng để thiết lập một môi trườngđó là thuận lợi cho việc cải thiện thành tích học sinh.