Level 1: Positive emotion at the wi

Level 1: Positive emotion at the within-person level of analysis
Neuropsychological correlates of positive emotion At the most basic level of understanding, neurobiological processes underlie the experience of emotion, including perception, and understanding and display of positive emotional expression. Mirroring the emphasis on negative emotions in organizational research, however, much of the literature in emotions research in general has been oriented towards the negative emotions. LeDoux, for example, based his pioneering work on a study of fear (see LeDoux, 1998). More recently, it has become clear that positive emotion is perceived, integrated and expressed by discrete neurobiological mechanisms that are quite distinct from the mechanisms associated with negative emotion (see LeDoux, 2000). In particular, recent research has revealed that positive environmental stimuli are recognized by the basal ganglia region of the brain, while negative or aversive environmental stimuli are processed primarily by the amygdala. The basal ganglia are programmed to encode sequences of behavior that, over time, have been repeated and rewarded – or at least not punished (Lieberman, 2000). The affective representations that are encoded by the basal ganglia support not only the execution of habitual behaviors but the prediction of what comes next in a sequence of thoughts or actions (LeDoux et al., 1989). These implicit skills are essential because they allow us to make automatic the sequences of thought and action that lead to adaptive success. Further, basal ganglia activation has been found to be associated with the experience of positive emotions in response to positive environmental stimuli (McPherson and Cummings, 1996). As such, and as Brieter and Rosen (1999) have shown, degeneration of the basal ganglia is associated with depression and a lack of motivation to adaptive environmental demands. The ability to perceive and integrate positive emotional stimuli thus has important implications for adaptive social functioning, and is mediated by the basal ganglia. Isen (2003) argues further that positive affect is a key facilitator of creativity. Consistent with the neuropsychological view noted earlier in this chapter, Isen and her colleagues (Ashby et al., 1999) posit that this process is mediated by the neurotransmitter dopamine. In their theory, dopamine levels in the blood are increased as a result of positive emotions, and the presence of this neurotransmitter in the anterior cingulate cortex is responsible for more creative and flexible cognitions. In effect, there is strong evidence that positive and negative affect are driven by distinct neural circuits. Moreover, in support of Ashkanasy’s (2003a) multi-level model, Isen (2003) argues that the impact of positive
affect on creativity at the group and organizational level derives from fundamental differences in mechanisms underlying the production of positive and negative affect, and differences in the impact of positive and negative affect on cognitive functioning. In the following, we describe theoretical frameworks for understanding the differential impact of positive and negative mood on cognitive processing. Cognitive correlates of positive emotion Several cognitive mechanisms have been proposed to underlie the differential impact of positive and negative affect on cognitive functioning. Affect influences both the content of cognition, and the strategies that people use to process information. As such, positive and negative mood have different effects on the content and processes of cognition.
Content effects
The content effects of mood have received considerable attention in affect and cognition research (Forgas and Bower, 1987). The primary finding here relates to the notion of ‘mood congruence’, which holds that individuals in a positive mood are likely to evaluate situational cues as correspondingly optimistic or positive, so that their associated judgments and decisions are also more likely to be positive. For example, people in a positive mood tend to form more positive impressions of others (Forgas et al., 1984), and to make more optimistic risk assessments (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). People in a negative mood, on the other hand, are more likely to make more pessimistic risk assessments (Mittal and Ross, 1998), and to evaluate other people and situations more negatively (Forgas and Bower, 1987). A number of cognitive theories of affect congruence have been proposed. For example Bower’s (1981) ‘Affect Priming Theory’ and Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) ‘Affectas- Information Model’. Affect priming is based on an associative network model of mental representation (Bower, 1981; Isen et al., 1978). Fundamental to this model is the assumption that affective and cognitive representations are linked in an associative semantic network. Affect can infuse judgments by facilitating or priming access to related cognitive categories (Bower, 1981). As such, judgment and decision processes that rely on recall processes may be affected by positive affect. Consequently, when in a positive mood, managers are likely to be more optimistic, entrepreneurial, and to take more risks as their perception and assessment of situations is positively biased. The affect-priming account suggests an indirect influence of affect on judgments, via the priming of affect-congruent semantic categories. The affect-as-information model suggests on the other hand that mood may also have direct informational effects, serving as a heuristic cue from which to
infer judgments. When presented with a judgmental target, instead of deriving a response from a constructive, elaborate information search, people may simply ask themselves, ‘How do I feel about it?’ and base their judgments on this affective response (Schwarz, 1990). Moderators of affect-congruence While there is much empirical support for both content and processing effects of moods, there are many instances where affect infusion may not occur, and neither the affect priming nor the affect-as-information accounts can explain all such instances. Furthermore, there are cases in which the mood congruence literature and the mood and information processing literature make opposite predictions for the outcome of mood on cognition and behavior (Forgas, 1995). In response to this discrepancy, Forgas (1995) proposed the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) to explain the individual, situational and task differences that moderate the impact of moods and emotions on cognition and behavior, via their impact on processing strategy (see also Forgas, 2002, for a comprehensive review). The primary assumption of the AIM is process mediation: the nature and extent of mood effects depends on the information processing strategy used for a particular task. The second assumption of the AIM is effort minimization: people should adopt the least effortful processing strategy capable of producing a response, all other things being equal (see Figure 5.1). Mood congruence effects are most likely when some degree of open, constructive processing is used (heuristic and substantive strategies), and less likely when closed strategies are used (direct access and motivated processing).