Absolute versus relative rightsThe boundaries of compensable loss in torts have been expanding.Civilian scholars have described the domain of protected interests ashaving gradually expanded along the following path: (a) protectionof absolute rights; (b) protection of relative rights; and (c) protectionof other (legitimate) expectations. The recovery of economic lossconfronts a dogmatic obstacle because the ‘unreified’ economicinterests often relate to the parties’ unfulfillled contractual expectations or other expectations of economic significance. Several Ricochet loss cases are on point. The loss to the ricochet victim derivesfrom the defendant’s wrongful act, which prevents a third party fromfulfillling the victim’s contractual expectation. Other cases mayrelate to the infringement of a yet unmatured economic interest.Such cases of tortious interference with contractual expectationshave traditionally posed a problem in civil law systems. Economicloss derived from the breach of a non-absolute right, in fact, doesnot enjoy erga omnes protection, since the action can, in principle,only be brought against the breaching party, not against a thirdparty that (negligently) interfered with the contractual interest.This argument is well-established in the Germanic legal tradition.The distinction between absolute or relative right – based upon thenature of the underlying interests protected by the legal system – hastraditionally served in the German and German-influenced systemsas a theoretical framework providing a default template of remediesand rules concerning the standing and scope of protection of suchrights. At the same time, the distinction has created some artificialinertia in the adaptation of the legal system to new changingrealities.It can be argued that this approach ultimately begs the question:what should be the desirable protection of pure economic interests?50 First, if the rationale for the exclusionary rule is that ‘relative’rights (such as economic interests and contractual expectations)should not be protected erga omnes, the explanation would suggestthat all such relative rights would remain uncompensated if violatedby a third party. This explanation contradicts the fact that theexclusionary rule is associated with the negligence standard, but notcases of intentional breach. 51 Furthermore, all ‘consequential’ economic losses (i.e., losses that are related to a previous loss of thevictim suffered because of the infringement of an absolute right ofthe victim) are fully recoverable in all systems that we have studied.These elements show that the exclusionary rule is not simply theconsequence of dogmatic path dependence, but a reflection of otherpolicy concerns.