Switzerland, for example, states that the extent of the incentives to infrastructure network investments given by infrastructure sharing regulations depends on the cost modelling that the regulator uses when determining prices. Furthermore, the Swiss Administration states that if the LRIC model is applied, the investment incentives for the regulated dominant operator should remain on an efficient level and the incentives for investments of non-SMP operators should be fostered significantly.
Trinidad and Tobago states that incentives can accompany any such infrastructure-sharing regulations to ensure a more confident investor, although recognizing the difficulty of requiring mandatory access that gives incentives to new entrants while also giving incentives for investors to roll out infrastructure networks.
Costa Rica states that the existing interconnection prices do not provide any incentive for investment in network infrastructure, while the Administration of Malaysia states that the prices for infrastructure sharing are not regulated and that commercial prices for infrastructure sharing provide adequate incentives to invest. According to the Malaysian statement, this view is supported by the presence of new entrants whose sole activity is building towers for leasing to other service providers.