Special Briefing
The Impact of Thailand’s May 2014
Military Coup
Overview
In May 2014, Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief
Prayuth Chan-ocha declared martial law. Two days later,
he triggered a military coup by ordering the arrests
of political leaders after the failure of a crisis meeting
he had chaired between leaders of the government
and opposition parties (and their respective popular
movements). Arrests, media censorship and a night
curfew continue.
This is Thailand’s first military coup since September
2006. It is rapidly evolving into a more ambitious
crackdown than in 2006, on all forms of activity in
support of the elected Pheu Thai Party government and
the 2007 Constitution. The army has the support of the
metropolitan elite and establishment political parties, and
has been able to declare royal assent from King Bhumibol
Adulyadej (born in 1927).
We expect the army to maintain a hold on power, without
swift resolution via elections or a new permanent
constitution, for an indefinite period. This could include a
period extending after Bhumibol’s reign ends, as the royal
succession remains highly politicised. We expect the coup
to be broadly successful on the army’s terms but with
impacts on Thai society, politics and the economy (with
2014 growth of 1%).
Investment and household spending have been
contracting violently since Q3-Q4 2013, with trade also
starting to be affected by the political impasse from
Q1 2014. At best, the coup could stabilise output and
facilitate army-approved investment from Q3 2014. At
worst, it will depress private consumption, tourism and
foreign investment as it stirs new forms of anti-coup
resistance, and counter-repression.
Commercial Implications
n The 2006 coup led to a recession in construction
and public spending in the Pheu Thai-voting north
and northeast, with less of an impact on Bangkok.
We expect this regional pattern to repeat in 2014
n The 2006 coup had a nationwide negative impact on
‘community, social and personal service’ activities to
end-2007. This includes activities to do with recreation
and media content; this pattern will repeat even if
tourism is stable
n The more comprehensive military control is, the less
dissent will be able to disrupt the economy, but the more
such restraints will have an impact. Much depends on the
uncertain modalities and intensity of anti-coup activity
Recommendations
n DO NOT disseminate this Special Briefing to associates
based in or due to travel to Thailand; it covers the royal
succession, punishable under Thai law
n Expect the core industrial base to suffer little disruption
to supply chains over the short term, as long as the
former government’s mass support base is too shocked
or cowed to respond with popular mobilisation against
the army coup
n Expect the security situation in the islands and resorts
to remain benign; with a limited impact on tourism,
so long as the successful military control of media
and public space does not necessitate repeat bouts of
violent repression
n Expect discretionary spending to remain depressed
(despite flexible policing of the curfew in urban areas
with high concentrations of spending)