Reforming the Merits:
Meritocratic Recruitment and
its Effect on Corruption
Case Study of Tajikistan
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to observe the causal mechanism between meritocratic recruitment
and level of corruption. Previous cross country analyses showed positive results, however
what is lacking in academic literature is micro-analyses that would capture the positive and
negative ways of causal mechanism which will be an added value to the academic literature.
The current research does not aim to build the hypothesis but rather complements the
research on meritocracy by looking at a single case study, taking Tajikistan, a country in
Central Asia. The paper identifies and analyses relative difference in implementation of the
public administration reform and perception of sample agencies, Ministry of Education and
Ministry of Finance pertaining to meritocracy and corruption.
The empirical analysis is based on twenty one interviews with persons responsible for reform
making and reform implementation. To validate the answers a group of independent
observers is included. The findings of the empirical analysis show that meritocratic
recruitment does not have an effect on the level of corruption at its earliest endorsement in a
transit country such as Tajikistan. It is formally endorsed within the new public
administration system, but instead a majority of civil servants are hired and promoted on the
basis of patronage and all types of contacts.