The roots of the present procedures

The roots of the present procedures can be traced back directly to the studies of Sir Francis Galton nearly 70 years ago, and to later developments such as time sampling studies of recreational activities, controlled observation tests, and anecdotal records. The critical incident technique as such, however, can best be regarded as an outgrowth of studies in the Aviation Psychology Program of the United States Army Air Forces in World War II. The Aviation Psychology Program was established in the summer of 1941 to develop procedures for the selection and classification of aircrews.
One of the first studies (40) carried out in this program was the analysis of the specific reasons for failure in learning to fly that were reported for 1,000 pilot candidates eliminated from flight training schools in the summer and early fall of 1941. The basic source used in this analysis was the proceedings of the elimination boards. In these proceedings the pilot instructors and check pilots reported their reasons for eliminating the particular pilot. It was found that many of the reasons given were clichés and stereotypes such as "lack of inherent flying ability" and ''inadequate sense of sustentation," or generalizations such as ''unsuitable temperament," "poor judgment," or "insufficient progress." However, along with these a number of specific observations of particular behaviors were reported. This study provided the basis for the research program on selecting pilots. Although it was found very useful, it also indicated very clearly the need for better procedures for obtaining a representative sample of factual incidents regarding pilot performance.
A second study (13), which emphasized the importance of factual reports on performance made by competent observers, was carried out in the winter of 1943-1944 in the 8th, 9th, 12th, and 15th Air Forces. This study collected the reasons for the failures of bombing missions as reported in the Group Mission Reports.
Although in the preparation of these reports much greater emphasis was given to determining the precise facts in the case, it was apparent that in many instances the official reports did not provide a complete record of all the important events. Even with these limitations, the information given was found to be of considerable value, and the systematic tabulations that were prepared provided the basis for a series of recommendations that resulted in important changes in Air Force selection and training procedures.
In the summer of 1944 a series of studies (74) was planned on the problem of combat leadership in the United States Army Air Forces. These represent the first large-scale, systematic effort to gather specific incidents of effective or ineffective behavior with respect to a designated activity. The instructions asked the combat veterans to report incidents observed by them that involved behavior which was especially helpful or inadequate in accomplishing the assigned mission. The statement finished with the request, "Describe the officer's action. What did he do?" Several thousand incidents were collected in this way and analyzed to provide a relatively objective and factual definition of effective combat leadership. The resulting set of descriptive categories was called the "critical requirements" of combat leadership.
Another study (74) conducted in the Aviation Psychology Program involved a survey of disorientation while flying.1 Disorientation in this study was defined to include any experience denoting uncertainty as to one's spatial position in relation to the vertical. In this study pilots returning from combat were asked "to think of some occasion during combat flying in which you personally experienced feelings of acute disorientation or strong vertigo." They were then asked to describe what they "saw, heard, or felt that brought on the experience." This study led to a number of recommendations regarding changes in cockpit and instrument panel design and in training in order to overcome and prevent vertigo while flying.
In a project carried out in the Aviation Psychology Program in 1946, Fitts and Jones (12) collected descriptions of specific experiences from pilots in taking off, flying on instruments, landing, using controls, and using instruments. These interviews with pilots were electrically recorded. They provided many factual incidents that were used as a basis for planning research on the design of instruments and controls and the arrangement of these within the cockpit.
In addition to the collection of specific incidents and the formulation of critical requirements, as outlined above, the summary volume (13) for the Aviation Psychology Program Research Reports contained a discussion of the theoretical basis of procedures for obtaining the critical requirements of a particular activity. Perhaps the best method of describing the status of these procedures at the close of the war is to quote from the discussion in this summary volume, which was written in the late spring of 1946. In the section on techniques for defining job requirements, the present author wrote as follows:
The principal objective of job analysis procedures should be the determination of critical requirements. These requirements include those which have been demonstrated to have made the difference between success and failure in carrying out an important part of the job assigned in a significant number of instances. Too often, statements regarding job requirements are merely lists of all the desirable traits of human beings. These are practically no help in selecting, classifying, or training individuals for specific jobs. To obtain valid information regarding the truly critical requirements for success in a specific assignment, procedures were developed in the Aviation Psychology Program for making systematic analyses of causes of good and poor performance.
Essentially, the procedure was to obtain first-hand reports, or reports from objective records, of satisfactory and unsatisfactory execution of the task assigned. The cooperating individual described a situation in which success or failure was determined by specific re-ported causes.
This procedure was found very effective in obtaining information from individuals con-cerning their own errors, from subordinates concerning errors of their superiors, from su-pervisors with respect to their subordinates, and also from participants with respect to co-participants (13, pp. 273-274).

Results (Indonesian) 1:

Akar prosedur yang hadir dapat ditelusuri kembali langsung ke studi Sir Francis Galton hampir 70 tahun yang lalu, dan untuk perkembangan seperti studi waktu sampling kegiatan rekreasi, dikontrol pengamatan tes, dan anekdot catatan. Kritis insiden teknik seperti itu, namun, dapat terbaik dianggap sebagai suatu perkembangan dari studi di Program psikologi penerbangan dari Angkatan Udara Angkatan Darat Amerika Serikat dalam Perang Dunia II. Penerbangan psikologi Program didirikan pada musim panas tahun 1941 dan mengembangkan prosedur untuk pemilihan dan klasifikasi awak pesawat.One of the first studies (40) carried out in this program was the analysis of the specific reasons for failure in learning to fly that were reported for 1,000 pilot candidates eliminated from flight training schools in the summer and early fall of 1941. The basic source used in this analysis was the proceedings of the elimination boards. In these proceedings the pilot instructors and check pilots reported their reasons for eliminating the particular pilot. It was found that many of the reasons given were clichés and stereotypes such as "lack of inherent flying ability" and ''inadequate sense of sustentation," or generalizations such as ''unsuitable temperament," "poor judgment," or "insufficient progress." However, along with these a number of specific observations of particular behaviors were reported. This study provided the basis for the research program on selecting pilots. Although it was found very useful, it also indicated very clearly the need for better procedures for obtaining a representative sample of factual incidents regarding pilot performance.A second study (13), which emphasized the importance of factual reports on performance made by competent observers, was carried out in the winter of 1943-1944 in the 8th, 9th, 12th, and 15th Air Forces. This study collected the reasons for the failures of bombing missions as reported in the Group Mission Reports.Although in the preparation of these reports much greater emphasis was given to determining the precise facts in the case, it was apparent that in many instances the official reports did not provide a complete record of all the important events. Even with these limitations, the information given was found to be of considerable value, and the systematic tabulations that were prepared provided the basis for a series of recommendations that resulted in important changes in Air Force selection and training procedures.In the summer of 1944 a series of studies (74) was planned on the problem of combat leadership in the United States Army Air Forces. These represent the first large-scale, systematic effort to gather specific incidents of effective or ineffective behavior with respect to a designated activity. The instructions asked the combat veterans to report incidents observed by them that involved behavior which was especially helpful or inadequate in accomplishing the assigned mission. The statement finished with the request, "Describe the officer's action. What did he do?" Several thousand incidents were collected in this way and analyzed to provide a relatively objective and factual definition of effective combat leadership. The resulting set of descriptive categories was called the "critical requirements" of combat leadership.Another study (74) conducted in the Aviation Psychology Program involved a survey of disorientation while flying.1 Disorientation in this study was defined to include any experience denoting uncertainty as to one's spatial position in relation to the vertical. In this study pilots returning from combat were asked "to think of some occasion during combat flying in which you personally experienced feelings of acute disorientation or strong vertigo." They were then asked to describe what they "saw, heard, or felt that brought on the experience." This study led to a number of recommendations regarding changes in cockpit and instrument panel design and in training in order to overcome and prevent vertigo while flying.In a project carried out in the Aviation Psychology Program in 1946, Fitts and Jones (12) collected descriptions of specific experiences from pilots in taking off, flying on instruments, landing, using controls, and using instruments. These interviews with pilots were electrically recorded. They provided many factual incidents that were used as a basis for planning research on the design of instruments and controls and the arrangement of these within the cockpit.In addition to the collection of specific incidents and the formulation of critical requirements, as outlined above, the summary volume (13) for the Aviation Psychology Program Research Reports contained a discussion of the theoretical basis of procedures for obtaining the critical requirements of a particular activity. Perhaps the best method of describing the status of these procedures at the close of the war is to quote from the discussion in this summary volume, which was written in the late spring of 1946. In the section on techniques for defining job requirements, the present author wrote as follows:The principal objective of job analysis procedures should be the determination of critical requirements. These requirements include those which have been demonstrated to have made the difference between success and failure in carrying out an important part of the job assigned in a significant number of instances. Too often, statements regarding job requirements are merely lists of all the desirable traits of human beings. These are practically no help in selecting, classifying, or training individuals for specific jobs. To obtain valid information regarding the truly critical requirements for success in a specific assignment, procedures were developed in the Aviation Psychology Program for making systematic analyses of causes of good and poor performance.Essentially, the procedure was to obtain first-hand reports, or reports from objective records, of satisfactory and unsatisfactory execution of the task assigned. The cooperating individual described a situation in which success or failure was determined by specific re-ported causes.This procedure was found very effective in obtaining information from individuals con-cerning their own errors, from subordinates concerning errors of their superiors, from su-pervisors with respect to their subordinates, and also from participants with respect to co-participants (13, pp. 273-274).