First, Hart plausibly contends that there are moral ideals which, unlike moral obligations, arenot regarded as a matter for censure when we fail to achieve them, but are a basis for praiseand admiration when we succeed in realizing them. However, I think he is too quick tocharacterize a whole series of moral virtues, such as bravery, charity, benevolence, etc. asessentially supererogatory, as a matter of conformity with moral reasons for action that are notobligations. His analysis would have been more persuasive, I think, if we had kept in mind thedistinction between perfect and imperfect obligations. Arguably, what distinguishes justice from charity is that any obligations associated with the latter are imperfect, rather thanperfect. Hence, a person who never renders assistance to needy individuals who nonethelesshave no right to his assistance, a judge who never tempers justice with mercy in sentencing,are open to moral criticism, and potentially criticism in terms of non-compliance with certain
obligations. It’s just that the
performance of the obligations in question cannot be demandedas of right by anyone. Of course, this still leaves open the possibility that some of the reasonsassociated with these virtues are truly supererogatory.