cash crop. Thus, a plant is a weed

cash crop. Thus, a plant is a weed only in certain un~eTstandings .of it, p~r­ ricular dispositions toward it for particular human beings. There IS nothing natural, impersonal or objective in calling a plant a weed. It takes on this label by virtue of the life practices of a certain culture which understands certain plants as useful and others as not, and the resulting dispositions toward those unuseful plants. Thus, culture in a sense is a network of habi­ tual dispositions, different cultures heing composed of different habitual dispositions, all embodied in the habitus.
The dispositions and practices are commonly expressed through symbols,
that class of signs which bears a conventional relationship to their signi­ fications. Most words in natural languages are symbols in exactly this sense; building on ancient insights, Saussure (19 59[ 1916)) pointed out the com­ pletely arbitrary relationship between the form of the French word arbre and its meaning "tree." This arbitrariness is amply demonstrated by the word designating this in other languages: German Baum, Tok Pisin diwai, Tagslog kanoy, Indonesian pohon, Yimas yan, Watam padol). Understandings and practices are realized for humans through symbols. One view of cul­ ture, then, is really as a system of symbols by which a human being enacts his/her embodied understanding. This is the view propounded by the influ­ ential school of symbolic anthropology. the best known representative of this view probably being Geertz. He views culture as a system of public meanings encoded in symbols and articulated in behavior seen as symbolic action. These symbols are public expressions of shared practices and under­ standings among those who can be described as having the same culture. Cultural meanings are not in individual minds, but rather they are shared by the social actors. Cultural meanings are public meanings encoded in shared symbols, not self-contained private understandings. For Geertz, "they are things of this world" (Geert2 1973: 10). Consider the earlier example of the involuntary twitch versus a wink. The latter counts as culture by virtue
of it being symbolic action - a conventionalized gesture communicating a particular meaning. But it only does this by virtue of a public code in which doing so counts as a signal of conspiracy. Knowing what counts as winking is not the same as winking. Another example Geertz provides as an item of culture is a Beethoven quartet (Geertz 1973: it):


that a Beethoven quartet is a temporally developed tonal structure, a coherent sequence of modified sound - in a word, music - and not anybody's know­ ledge of or belief about anything, including how to play it, is a proposition for which most people are, upon reflection, likely to assent.


Geertz's view of culture is thoroughly grounded in human embodied beings engaging in social action. This leads him to view thinking as prim­ arily social and public and only derivatively as the private function of the

Results (Indonesian) 1:

tanaman. Dengan demikian, tanaman adalah gulma hanya dalam PBB tertentu ~ eTstandings .of itu, p ~ r ricular kecenderungan terhadap manusia tertentu. Tidak ada yang alami, impersonal atau tujuan dalam memanggil tanaman gulma. Dibutuhkan pada label ini berdasarkan praktek-praktek kehidupan budaya tertentu yang memahami tanaman tertentu sebagai berguna dan lain-lain tidak, dan disposisi dihasilkan terhadap tanaman membuang tersebut. Dengan demikian, budaya dalam arti adalah jaringan habi tual disposisi, budaya yang berbeda heing terdiri dari kecenderungan kebiasaan yang berbeda, Semua diwujudkan dalam habitus.Watak dan praktik sering diungkapkan melalui simbol,that class of signs which bears a conventional relationship to their signi­ fications. Most words in natural languages are symbols in exactly this sense; building on ancient insights, Saussure (19 59[ 1916)) pointed out the com­ pletely arbitrary relationship between the form of the French word arbre and its meaning "tree." This arbitrariness is amply demonstrated by the word designating this in other languages: German Baum, Tok Pisin diwai, Tagslog kanoy, Indonesian pohon, Yimas yan, Watam padol). Understandings and practices are realized for humans through symbols. One view of cul­ ture, then, is really as a system of symbols by which a human being enacts his/her embodied understanding. This is the view propounded by the influ­ ential school of symbolic anthropology. the best known representative of this view probably being Geertz. He views culture as a system of public meanings encoded in symbols and articulated in behavior seen as symbolic action. These symbols are public expressions of shared practices and under­ standings among those who can be described as having the same culture. Cultural meanings are not in individual minds, but rather they are shared by the social actors. Cultural meanings are public meanings encoded in shared symbols, not self-contained private understandings. For Geertz, "they are things of this world" (Geert2 1973: 10). Consider the earlier example of the involuntary twitch versus a wink. The latter counts as culture by virtueof it being symbolic action - a conventionalized gesture communicating a particular meaning. But it only does this by virtue of a public code in which doing so counts as a signal of conspiracy. Knowing what counts as winking is not the same as winking. Another example Geertz provides as an item of culture is a Beethoven quartet (Geertz 1973: it):that a Beethoven quartet is a temporally developed tonal structure, a coherent sequence of modified sound - in a word, music - and not anybody's know­ ledge of or belief about anything, including how to play it, is a proposition for which most people are, upon reflection, likely to assent.Geertz's view of culture is thoroughly grounded in human embodied beings engaging in social action. This leads him to view thinking as prim­ arily social and public and only derivatively as the private function of the

Results (Indonesian) 2:

tanaman komersial. Dengan demikian, tanaman adalah gulma hanya di un ~ eTstandings tertentu .dari itu, p ~ r disposisi ricular ke arah itu untuk manusia tertentu. Tidak ada yang alami, impersonal atau tujuan dalam memanggil tanaman rumput liar. Dibutuhkan pada label ini berdasarkan praktik kehidupan budaya tertentu yang mengerti tanaman tertentu sebagai berguna dan lain-lain tidak, dan disposisi yang dihasilkan terhadap mereka tanaman unuseful. Dengan demikian, budaya dalam arti adalah jaringan disposisi tual habi, budaya yang berbeda heing terdiri dari disposisi kebiasaan yang berbeda, semua yang terkandung dalam habitus.
The disposisi dan praktek umumnya diekspresikan melalui simbol-simbol,
bahwa kelas tanda-tanda yang dikenakan hubungan konvensional untuk mereka fikasi signifikan. Sebagian besar kata-kata dalam bahasa alami adalah simbol persis pengertian ini; membangun wawasan kuno, Saussure (19 59 [1916)) menunjukkan com pletely hubungan sewenang-wenang antara bentuk kata arbre Perancis dan artinya "pohon." Kesewenang-wenangan ini didemonstrasikan oleh kata menunjuk ini dalam bahasa lain: Jerman Baum, Tok Pisin diwai, Tagslog kanoy, pohon Indonesia, Yimas yan, Watam padol). Pemahaman dan praktek yang diwujudkan untuk manusia melalui simbol-simbol. Salah satu pandangan mendatang cul, maka, adalah benar-benar sebagai sistem simbol dimana seorang manusia memberlakukan / dia memahami diwujudkan. Ini adalah pandangan yang dikemukakan oleh influ sekolah sajalah antropologi simbolik. wakil paling terkenal dari pandangan ini mungkin menjadi Geertz. Dia memandang budaya sebagai sistem makna publik dikodekan dalam simbol-simbol dan diartikulasikan dalam perilaku dipandang sebagai aksi simbolis. Simbol-simbol ini merupakan ungkapan umum dari praktek bersama dan di bawah klasemen di antara mereka yang dapat digambarkan sebagai memiliki budaya yang sama. Makna budaya tidak dalam pikiran individu, melainkan mereka bersama dengan aktor sosial. Makna budaya yang arti umum dikodekan dalam simbol-simbol bersama, tidak mandiri pemahaman pribadi. Untuk Geertz, "mereka adalah hal-hal dari dunia ini" (Geert2 1973: 10). Perhatikan contoh sebelumnya paksa yang kedutan dibandingkan mengedipkan mata. Penghitungan terakhir sebagai budaya berdasarkan
itu menjadi aksi simbolis - sikap conventionalized berkomunikasi makna tertentu. Tapi itu hanya melakukan ini berdasarkan kode publik yang demikian dianggap sebagai sinyal dari konspirasi. Mengetahui apa yang dianggap sebagai mengedip tidak sama dengan mengedip. Contoh lain Geertz memberikan sebagai item budaya adalah kuartet Beethoven (Geertz 1973: itu):


bahwa kuartet Beethoven adalah struktur tonal temporal dikembangkan, urutan yang koheren suara diubah - dalam kata, musik - dan tidak tahu langkan siapa pun dari atau keyakinan tentang apa pun, termasuk cara memainkannya, adalah proposisi yang kebanyakan orang, setelah refleksi, kemungkinan persetujuan.


lihat Geertz budaya secara menyeluruh didasarkan pada manusia diwujudkan makhluk terlibat dalam aksi sosial. Hal ini menyebabkan dia untuk melihat berpikir sebagai sopan arily sosial dan umum dan hanya derivatively sebagai fungsi pribadi dari