Finally, not all extensions of morality beyond the obligations
and ideals generally recognized in a given society need
take the form of social criticism. It is important to remember
that morality has its private aspect, shown in the individual's
recognition of ideals which he need not either share with
others or regard as a source of criticism of others, still less of
society as a whole. Lives may be ruled by dedication to the
pursuit of heroic, romantic, aesthetic or scholarly ideals or,
less agreeably, to mortification of the flesh. Here too, it could
be argued that if we speak of morality, we do so because the
values thus pursued by individuals are at least analogous to
some of those recognized in the morality of their own society.
But the analogy is surely not one of content, but one of form
and function. For such ideals play, in the life of individuals,
the same part as morality does in a society. They are ranked
as supremely important, so that their pursuit is felt as duty
to which other interests or desires are to be sacrificed; though
conversions are possible the notion that such ideals could be
adopted, changed, or eliminated by a deliberate choice is
chimerical; and, finally, deviations from such ideals are 'punished'
by the same conscience, guilt, and remorse as that to
which social morality makes its primary appeal.