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In the final analysis, all aspects of risk management in a financial firm are corporategovernance issues in that the Board has ultimate responsibility for the fortunes of acompany. The NR episode raises several questions regarding the role of the Board of NR,and most especially the role of the non-executive Directors. In particular, to what extentdid the Board understand the implications of the bank’s strategy, and especially the riskcharacteristics?It is instructive to distinguish between formal, informal and market monitors of banks.Formal monitors are those agencies which are given explicit responsibility forsupervision: in the case of the UK this includes the FSA, the BOE and bank Boards.Informal monitors, on the other hand, include the media, consumers’ associations,academic analysts, etc. Market monitors include rating agencies, other banks, bankanalysts, etc. While each group has a different focus, and may represent differentinterests, they all in their own way perform monitoring or supervisory roles.The wider question is two-fold: (1) whether the various supervisors/monitors of the bankwere conducting their formal or informal supervisory roles effectively, and (2) whetherthey had sufficient information about the risk characteristics of the bank to makeinformed judgements. The central point is that, while criticisms may focus on officialagencies (the FSA in particular), it is evident that there was a generalised failure ofmonitoring and appreciation of the risks that NR was taking. In terms of the LPHI risk,there seems to have been a collective disaster myopia.
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