Rather, when we understand what the

Rather, when we understand what the producer of a malapropism means, we rely on our knowledge of the same semantic conventions that enable us to understand any sentence. Consider how my friend, the English teacher, probably discemed what the student meant. She noted that it is unkely that a student would accuse her of pederasty. Next, she recalled that pederasty" sounds quite like "pedantry' and decided that the student had confounded the two words. In order to figure out what the student meant my friend did not need to posit a new semantic convention, according to which pederast means pedant. She simply proceeded on the assumption that the student meant to say 'Pedant' and interpreted his utterance using the convention which states that pedant means pedants. 'Pederast' and pedant have only their usual meanings.
Reflection on malapropisms does not support the view that, in works of literature, sentences have non-literal meanings. If sentences in literature have secondary meanings, it must be possible for readers to grasp these meanings. Moreover, speakers must be able to grasp these meanings using their knowledge of existing semantic conventions, as my friend did when she grasped what the student meant. Unfortunately, this cannot be done. "Pederasty resembles pedantry and the student plainly did not mean that my friend is a pederast. This tipped her off to the semantic conventions which reveal the additional meaning of the student's malapropism. Nothing about sentences works of literature. Similarly tips off readers to the semantic conventions they need to employ in grasping non-literal meanings. The sentences in works of Bterature are false, butnreaders expect them to be false. Readers understand perfectly well the convention of telling stories composed of false sentences. The fact that sentences are obviously false does not set readers off on a quest to find additional meanings. These sentences typically do not resemble other sentences. Taken in their literal senses, they are perfectly appropriate in their contexts. Readers bave no for using any semantic conventions but the obvious ones when they grasp the meanings of sentences in literature. Suppose, for example, readers come across the sentence, A hungry fox tried to reach clusters of grapes which he saw hanging from a vine trained on a tree, but they were too high. Readers grasp the meaning of this sentence using conventions that specify that 'fox' means foxes, grapes means grapes, and so on. In general, only ordinary semantic conventions are employed in grasping the meanings of sentences works of literature,
Irony is another phenomenon which might seem to support the view that sentences in literary works have an additional meaning. Ironical statements do have meanings besides their literal meanings. Imagine that I find in my mailbox another idiotic memo from the Academic Vice-President. (Perhaps my department is directed to teach its course on Hume with an Asia-Pacific focus). "That is just wonderful',I exclaim. My statement literally means that the memo is wonderful, obviously, my words are meant ironically. They also mean, roughly that the memo is not wonderful. It might be thought that, like ironical statements

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Sebaliknya, ketika kita mengerti apa yang produsen malapropism berarti, kami bergantung pada pengetahuan semantik Konvensi sama yang memungkinkan kita untuk memahami setiap kalimat. Pertimbangkan bagaimana teman saya, guru bahasa Inggris, mungkin discemed siswa apa dimaksudkan. Dia mencatat bahwa itu adalah unkely bahwa siswa akan menuduh dia Perjantanan. Selanjutnya, dia ingat bahwa Perjantanan"terdengar cukup seperti" pedantry' dan memutuskan bahwa siswa telah bingung dua kata. Untuk mengetahui apa yang siswa dimaksud teman saya tidak perlu menempatkan semantik Konvensi baru, menurut homo yang berarti pedant. Ia hanya mulai pada asumsi bahwa siswa bermaksud mengatakan 'Pedant' dan ditafsirkan ucapan nya menggunakan konvensi yang menyatakan bahwa pedant berarti ilmuwan. 'Homo' dan pedant memiliki hanya makna mereka biasa.Reflection on malapropisms does not support the view that, in works of literature, sentences have non-literal meanings. If sentences in literature have secondary meanings, it must be possible for readers to grasp these meanings. Moreover, speakers must be able to grasp these meanings using their knowledge of existing semantic conventions, as my friend did when she grasped what the student meant. Unfortunately, this cannot be done. "Pederasty resembles pedantry and the student plainly did not mean that my friend is a pederast. This tipped her off to the semantic conventions which reveal the additional meaning of the student's malapropism. Nothing about sentences works of literature. Similarly tips off readers to the semantic conventions they need to employ in grasping non-literal meanings. The sentences in works of Bterature are false, butnreaders expect them to be false. Readers understand perfectly well the convention of telling stories composed of false sentences. The fact that sentences are obviously false does not set readers off on a quest to find additional meanings. These sentences typically do not resemble other sentences. Taken in their literal senses, they are perfectly appropriate in their contexts. Readers bave no for using any semantic conventions but the obvious ones when they grasp the meanings of sentences in literature. Suppose, for example, readers come across the sentence, A hungry fox tried to reach clusters of grapes which he saw hanging from a vine trained on a tree, but they were too high. Readers grasp the meaning of this sentence using conventions that specify that 'fox' means foxes, grapes means grapes, and so on. In general, only ordinary semantic conventions are employed in grasping the meanings of sentences works of literature,Irony is another phenomenon which might seem to support the view that sentences in literary works have an additional meaning. Ironical statements do have meanings besides their literal meanings. Imagine that I find in my mailbox another idiotic memo from the Academic Vice-President. (Perhaps my department is directed to teach its course on Hume with an Asia-Pacific focus). "That is just wonderful',I exclaim. My statement literally means that the memo is wonderful, obviously, my words are meant ironically. They also mean, roughly that the memo is not wonderful. It might be thought that, like ironical statements