It is a mistake to make generalizations about two opposing
theories of law: natural law and legal positivism.' Both
theories level charges against the other. Some are perceptive;
others are unfounded. What is less well known, but
equally true, is that historically both the natural law defenders
and the proponents of legal positivism have disagreed as
much among themselves as with their opponents. 2 If progress
is to be made in legal philosophy by studying the works
of important legal philosophers, it will be made by carefully
examining the theories developed, rather than by attaching a
label to the philosopher and then assuming certain things
about that legal philosopher because the label has been attached.
This is particularly true of the works of H.L.A. Hart.
To better understand H.L.A. Hart, it is worthwhile to
discuss some general comments made by those legal philosophers
not sympathetic to legal positivism. Generally, natural
law asserts several principles that are irreconcilable with
legal positivism. Most importantly, natural law finds that
there is a necessary, not a contingent, relationship between
law and morality. According to natural law theory, when
there is a conflict between natural law and human law