Agency theory, audit committee, and

Agency theory, audit committee, and timeliness of reporting Research on audit committees is mainly based on agency theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). According to agency theory, because of separation and divergence of interest between management (agents) and shareholders (principals), the agent may not always act in the best interest of principals creating agency problems such as excess spending, suboptimal investment decisions, and information asymmetry. This may be especially true when a very opportunistic person is involved in the process. The existence of AC is to protect shareholders’ interests through its oversight responsibility in the area of financial reporting, internal control, and external auditing activity (Turley and Zaman, 2004).
The relation between audit committee effectiveness and timeliness of reporting is based on the rationale that if audit committee is effective in performing its oversight duty of financial reporting process, it will affect the quality of financial reporting which may lead to timely presentation of financial information. As stated in the introduction section, there are a number of studies which examine the relationship between audit committee and financial reporting quality using a number of proxies for financial reporting quality. These studies found that the effectiveness of audit committee to some extent is dependent on the characteristics of the committee such as its independence, its frequency of meetings, and its size. Abbott et al. (2004) for example, who investigated financial reporting restatement in the USA during 1991-1999 found that the likelihood of firms restating their annual financial statements significantly decreased if the audit committee conducted meetings at least four times in a year, had at least one financial expert, and all audit committee members were independent. Using firms receiving a qualified audit report as a proxy for bad reporting quality, Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) found that audit committee size and the percentage of independent member in the audit committee affected the likelihood firms receiving qualified audit report due to error or non-compliance qualifications. Cohen and Hanno (2000) suggested that strong corporate governance (including an independent audit committee) were likely to increase audit effectiveness and efficiency by reducing the auditor’s perception of client business risk, the auditor’s control risk judgments for specific audit assertions and the amount of planned substantive testing. With regard to timeliness of reporting, Afify (2009) found that the existence of audit committee was likely to reduce the time spent by the auditor to accomplish the audit work. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1. Audit committee effectiveness is negatively associated with reporting lead time.

Results (Indonesian) 1:

Badan teori, komite audit dan ketepatan waktu laporan penelitian komite audit adalah terutama didasarkan pada teori badan yang diusulkan oleh Jensen dan Meckling (1976) dan Fama dan Jensen (1983). Menurut Badan teori, karena pemisahan dan perbedaan penting antara manajemen (agen) dan pemegang saham (kepala sekolah), agen mungkin tidak selalu bertindak dalam kepentingan terbaik kepala yang menciptakan masalah badan kelebihan pengeluaran, keputusan investasi suboptimal dan informasi asimetri. Ini mungkin terutama berlaku ketika seseorang sangat oportunistik terlibat dalam proses. Adanya AC adalah untuk melindungi kepentingan pemegang saham melalui tanggung jawab pengawasan di wilayah pelaporan keuangan, pengendalian internal, dan kegiatan audit eksternal (Turley dan Zaman, 2004).Hubungan antara efektivitas komite audit dan ketepatan waktu laporan ini didasarkan pada alasan bahwa jika komite audit efektif dalam melaksanakan tugasnya pengawasan, proses pelaporan keuangan, hal itu akan mempengaruhi kualitas pelaporan keuangan yang dapat mengakibatkan tepat waktu presentasi informasi keuangan. Seperti dinyatakan dalam bagian pendahuluan, ada sejumlah studi yang meneliti hubungan antara Komite audit dan kualitas pelaporan keuangan menggunakan sejumlah proxy untuk kualitas pelaporan keuangan. Studi ini menemukan bahwa efektivitas dari komite audit sampai batas tertentu tergantung pada karakteristik Komite kemerdekaan, frekuensi pertemuan dan ukurannya. Abbott et al. (2004) sebagai contoh, yang diselidiki keuangan pernyataan-kembali pelaporan di Amerika Serikat selama 1991-1999 menemukan bahwa kemungkinan perusahaan menegaskan kembali laporan keuangan tahunan yang signifikan menurun jika pertemuan Komite dilakukan audit setidaknya empat kali dalam setahun, memiliki setidaknya satu ahli keuangan, dan semua audit komite yang independen. Menggunakan perusahaan menerima laporan audit memenuhi syarat sebagai proxy untuk kualitas pelaporan yang buruk, Pucheta-Martinez dan Fuentes (2007) menemukan bahwa ukuran komite audit dan persentase independen anggota komite audit terpengaruh kemungkinan perusahaan menerima laporan audit memenuhi syarat karena kesalahan atau non-kepatuhan kualifikasi. Cohen dan Hanno (2000) menyarankan bahwa kuat tata kelola (termasuk komite audit independen) yang mungkin untuk meningkatkan efisiensi dan efektivitas audit dengan mengurangi auditor persepsi risiko bisnis klien, auditor kontrol penilaian risiko untuk pernyataan-pernyataan spesifik audit dan jumlah pengujian substantif direncanakan. Berkaitan dengan ketepatan waktu pelaporan, Afify (2009) menemukan bahwa keberadaan komite audit adalah mungkin untuk mengurangi waktu yang dihabiskan oleh auditor untuk menyelesaikan audit. Oleh karena itu, hipotesis dinyatakan sebagai berikut:H1. Efektivitas Komite Audit negatif dikaitkan dengan pelaporan waktu.