Second, we find evidence that, among firms that do not purchase tax services
from their auditors, those that would miss their earnings forecasts absent ETR
changes exhibit larger ETR decreases between the third and fourth quarters than
those that would otherwise meet or beat these forecasts. This result is inconsistent
with the Maydew and Shackelford 2006 expectation that using nonauditor providers
for tax services would signal a higher quality audit. However, we do find evidence
that, prior to the passage of SOX, an association existed between missing income
targets absent ETR changes and greater third-to-fourth-quarter ETR reductions for
firms that do not purchase tax services from their auditors, but we cannot reliably
demonstrate this relation in the post-SOX period. By considering both the incentive
to meet earnings targets and payments to auditors and nonauditors for tax services,
we provide evidence on whether payments to auditors for tax services are associated
with opportunistic financial reporting of earnings and thus the need for the
additional restrictions proposed by the PCAOB.