Consider the case of corrective justice. Hart seems to be committed to the idea that the wrongsfor which corrective justice provides redress are themselves injustices. Even if this is not so,he regards such wrongs as essentially matters of misallocation, whereby it is essential to theirnature that their perpetrator deprives another of some benefit that belongs to him, or elseimposes upon him a burden he should not be made to bear. But what sense can we make of
this idea in the case of an assault? Hart’s answer is that it is not too far
-fetched to say that the
person who commits the assault ‘has profited at his victim’s expense, even if it is only by
indulging his wish to injure him or not sacrificing his ease to the duty of taking adequate
precautions’ (p.165). Presumably, a similar analysis extends to
the just punishment of someone who has committed an assault: they have arrogated to themselves greater liberty toindulge their will than the law-abiding members of their community, and the punishmentseems to cancel the extra benefit they have gained. Yet, it is strongly arguable that the ideathat just compensation or punishment fundamentally consists in a restoration of a just balanceof advantages between the wrongdoer and the law-abiding involves a fundamentallymisplaced focus. It fails to grasp that the victim is entitled to compensation, and the wrong-doer deserves punishment, because the latter has wronged the latter. And paradigmatically,
the wrong will consist in the violation of the former’s moral or legal rights. We do not need to
take the further step, in all cases, of characterizing the wrong as essentially involving thedisruption of some allocation of benefits and burdens, with a consequent gain on the part of the wrong-
doer at his victim’s or someone else’s expense.