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In this first of my two-part article I advance two core claims: first that
IPE was not born in 1970 but reaches back to the second half of the eighteenth
century when classical political economy emerged. To break the
Gordian Knot which links classical with modern international political
economy both limits our understanding of the historiography of the discipline,
while simultaneously providing a weakened normative conception
of what IPE should comprise. My second core claim is that the vast majority
of IPE, modern and classical, is embedded within different variants of
Eurocentrism. This means that rather than being premised on positivist,
objective, and universalist theories – or even those which are premised
on critical or heterodox approaches – the vast majority of international
politico–economic thought from 1760 onwards has effectively advanced
provincial or parochial normative visions that defend or promote or even
celebrate Europe and/or theWest as the highest or ideal normative referent
in the world political economy. And as implied above, this claim applies
almost as much to Brit-school IPE with its supposed ‘critical’ leanings as
it does to its ‘orthodox’ American cousin. One not insignificant upshot of
this claim is that the ‘great divide’ which Cohen and others believe separates
the ‘islands’ of the British and American schools of IPE, obscures
the Eurocentric metanarratival tunnel that joins them deep beneath the
intellectual seabed, even if these schools arrive at similar destinations via
different methodological routes.
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