This is the first case in the domestic courts where consideration has been given to the interaction between the right to freedom of expression conferred by Article 10 and the property right conferred on the owner of copyright. Note that the Chancery Division accepted that copyright is a form of property right which should be protected, in accordance with Article 1 to the First Protocol.
It is hardly surprising that the interpretation laid on Article 10 by the defendant did not find acceptance by the Court. It does not follow that because Article 10 is engaged in copyright disputes, that the facts of each case should fall to be considered to determine whether the restriction imposed by the law of copyright goes further than what is necessary in a democratic society. If this were right then intellectual property litigation would "burgeon out of control and the rights which the legislation apparently confers will be of no practical use except to those able and willing to litigate in all cases."
If every code incorporated by the legislative organ of the democratic state is to be completely overhauled by the Convention, the leges speciales in all areas (such as Copyright) will have to go way to the lex generalis of the Convention. This cannot be right. As the judge said, "there is no room for any further defences outside the code [under the 1988 Act] which establishes the particular species of intellectual property in question".